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**NAVAL
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MONTEREY, CALIFORNIA

THESIS

**ETHNIC CONFLICTS AND GOVERNMENTAL
CONFLICT MANAGEMENT**

by

Levent Can

December 2006

Thesis Advisor:
Second Reader:

Peter J. Gustaitis
Anna Simons

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This thesis study has three main parts. In the first part, Daniel Byman's four causes of ethnic conflicts are discussed. In the second part, I recommend a solution in the form of a coherent four-fold framework consisting of "population control," "winning hearts and minds," "strengthening national identity" and "reengineering the political system". In the last part, this framework is applied to present-day Iraq.

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ETHNIC CONFLICTS AND GOVERNMENTAL CONFLICT MANAGEMENT

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Submitted in partial fulfillment of the
requirements for the degree of

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While some multiethnic states suffer from ethnicity-based conflicts, others enjoy the benefits of diversity, such as different skill sets, interests, and cultures. However, the cost of ethnic conflict is overwhelming. Ernest Regehr wrote in 1993 that almost two-thirds of political conflicts worldwide were ethnic conflicts. Although ethnic conflict is a worldwide phenomenon, it is not fate. Unlike the many unfortunate ones, some ethnically divided nations have successfully lived together without giving rise to widespread bloodshed or forceful repression. Potential fault lines between parties have been reengineered and tensions have been regulated. In this study, the central question is focused on governmental policies as a tool to prevent conflict. Contrary to the general perception, the vast majority of ethnic conflicts are political. As a political problem, it can be exacerbated or moderated by governmental policies or the lack of such policies.

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I. INTRODUCTION

Every day, since the invasion of Iraq in 2003, hundreds of innocent Iraqis are losing their lives due to ongoing sectarian violence. The bombing of the Al-Askariya mosque in the Iraqi city of Samara was more than enough to trigger the bloody ethnic conflict. Now, while both coalition and Iraqi security forces conduct counterinsurgency warfare within that country, scholars around the world have put Iraq on the operating table, asking how a multiethnic Iraq can survive.

Many scholars have generated theoretical and empirical studies on the causes and consequences of communal strife. Using the work of these scholars, I found that ethnic conflict is neither the norm nor a certain fate in some multiethnic nations. I therefore raise the question, “Can governments prevent ethnic conflict through policy development and enforcement?” Of the more than two hundred nation-states in the world, few are ethnically homogenous; nearly all bear the mark of ethnic and cultural heterogeneity.¹ Among over two hundred sovereign states, it has been estimated that there are four thousand ethnocultural entities.² Forty percent contain five or more such communities, and fewer than a third have a single ethnic majority.³ Some, such as India and Nigeria, possess over one hundred ethnocultures. Others, such as Belgium, Fiji, Guyana, Northern Ireland, and Trinidad, are ethnically bipolar.⁴ Relations among these ethnic groups have varied dramatically.

While some of the multiethnic states are on the radar screen of the international community because of oppression, violent ethnic conflict, and human rights violations, others enjoy the benefits of diversity, such as different skill sets, interests, and cultures.

¹ Ralph R. Premdas, “Public Policy And Ethnic Conflict,” Discussion Paper Series - No. 12, 2002

² Ibid.

³ Ibid.

⁴ Ibid.

However, the cost of ethnic conflict is overwhelming. Worldwide, between 1900 and 1987, 170 million human beings were murdered by their own governments.⁵ These victims of internal conflicts by far outnumber those of wars between sovereign nation-states over the same period. Ernest Regehr wrote in 1993 that almost two-thirds of political conflicts worldwide were ethnic conflicts.⁶ Moreover, constitutionally democratic regimes in Sri Lanka, Lebanon, and Nigeria were destroyed and torn apart by ethnic conflict that led to civil war. The costs of ethnic conflict are devastating in terms of human lives and economics.

In contrast, some ethnically divided societies have managed to resolve the problem satisfactorily. Belgium was faced with a severe church-and-state conflict from 1830 to 1958 and from the 1950s to the 1980s was also wracked by a highly charged linguistic and territorial conflict between Flemings and Walloons.⁷ The Netherlands lived through an intense church-and-state conflict involving Protestants, Catholics, and secularists in the first quarter of the 20th century.⁸ In Malaysia, Malays and Chinese have clashed over economic, religious, linguistic, symbolic, and political issues since that country achieved its independence from the United Kingdom in 1957.

Although ethnic conflict is a worldwide phenomenon, it is not fate. Some ethnically divided nations have successfully lived together without giving rise to widespread bloodshed or forceful repression. Potential fault lines between parties have been reengineered and tensions have been regulated. In this study, the central question is focused on governmental policies as a tool to prevent conflict. Contrary to the general perception, the vast majority of ethnic conflicts are political. As a political problem, I argue that ethnic conflict can be either moderated or exacerbated by governmental policies or the lack of such policies.

⁵ The calculations were made by RJ Rummel and quoted in Theo Tshuy 1997, *Ethnic Conflict and Religion: Challenge to the Churches*, p. 19-20.

⁶ Ernest Regehr, quoted in John Paul Lederach, "Building Peace: Sustainable Reconciliation in Divided Societies," 1995, p. 7.

⁷ Eric A Nordlinger, "Conflict Regulation in Divided Societies," 1972, p. 19.

⁸ Ibid.

A. THE FRAMEWORK

Upon studying a number of ethnic conflicts and conflict resolution models, from David Horowitz's massive comparative study, *Ethnic Groups in Conflict* (1985), Eric Nordlinger's *Conflict Regulation in Divided Societies* (1972), Daniel Byman's *Keeping Peace* (2002), I conclude that the model Byman discusses in his book is the one most closely related to my thesis argument. I have used Byman's model as a point of departure and modified it in order to answer my thesis question.

One way to understand ethnic conflict prevention is to explore the causes of the conflict. Ethnic groups fight for many reasons, ranging from financial motives to cultural values that glorify war and feuding.⁹ Four causes of ethnic conflict are singled out, however, both for their frequency and virulence.¹⁰ Specifically, these are security fears, here defined as “security dilemmas,” status concerns, desire for hegemony, and leadership ambitions.

After discussing these leading causes of ethnic conflict, I recommend a solution in a coherent four-fold framework. First, security must be maintained and enforced impartially. Security is a primary concern of human beings; if threatened, even the most peace-loving societies may resort to violence. Second, population support should be maintained during sensitive transition periods. Third, a national identity that embraces all parts of a society should be reinforced by indirect means. Last but not least, ethnic minorities should be encouraged to advance their positions through participation in democratic processes.

B. METHODOLOGY AND ORGANIZATION OF THESIS

This study includes eight chapters, each focusing on a different aspect of the framework discussed earlier. In Chapter II, I define the following leading causes of ethnic conflict: security fears, status concerns, the desire for hegemony, and leadership ambitions. In Chapter III, I begin my discussion of the proposed “four-fold framework” by addressing the security concerns of ethnic groups. Providing security for every

⁹ Byman, p.14.

¹⁰ Ibid.

segment of the population rises as a pillar of the model. A secure environment not only eases tensions between ethnic parties but also facilitates the satisfactory performance of other policy tools.

Government can prevent ethnic conflict by gaining and maintaining the support of all the ethnic groups. Ethnic conflict prevention is a time-consuming process. It cannot be achieved overnight through enthusiastic political speeches. It needs to go through stages: infancy, adolescence, and adulthood.¹¹ Thus, in Chapter IV, I discuss the value of “winning hearts and minds.”

Government can also promote a national identity. The integration of all ethnic groups to a common cause absolutely reduces the risk of violent conflict.¹² Indisputably, many of the ethnically diverse nations of Europe in the 19th century emerged as nation-states in the 20th century. In the developing world, like Africa and the Middle East, however, attempts at nation building have often led to bitter conflict and have actually increased ethnic tensions.¹³ I explore this phenomenon in Chapter V.

A fair political system that enables the participation of all ethnic groups can bring the expectations and complaints of all parties into the legal arena. Participation can help groups sort out their differences that would otherwise likely lead to violence. However, in deeply divided societies, elections often lead to tyrannies of the majority or other undemocratic results. I study the merits of reengineering political systems in Chapter VI.

In Chapter VII, after building the pillars of the framework, I apply this model to current day Iraq as a test.

¹¹ Byman, p. 10.

¹² Ibid.

¹³ Ibid.

II. CAUSES OF ETHNIC CONFLICT

Many policymakers and journalists believe that the causes of ethnic conflicts are simple and straightforward.¹⁴ The driving forces behind violent ethnic conflicts, it is said, are the “ancient hatreds” that many ethnic groups have for each other.¹⁵ While writing about the Balkans, the American political commentator Richard Cohen declared, *“Bosnia is a formidable, scary place of high mountains, brutish people and tribal grievances rooted in the history and the myth born of boozy nights by fire. It is the place where World War I started and where wars of Europe persist, an ember of hate still glowing for reasons that defy reason itself.”*¹⁶

Some scholars, such as David Horowitz and Eric Nordflinger, argue that this explanation of ethnic conflict is too simple and cannot explain why violent conflicts have broken out in some places, but not others. It also cannot explain why some disputes are more violent and harder to resolve than others.¹⁷

Rather than relegating causes of conflict to “ancient hatreds,” examining selected causes in the first place will help us to develop a framework to prevent ethnic conflict. By understanding the causes of ethnic conflict, we are better able to prevent, counter, or live with it.¹⁸

Many scholars have developed different theories as to the causes of ethnic conflicts. Some of them emphasize economic and geographic problems. Others argue that problematic group histories are an important cause of conflict.¹⁹ Byman (2002) identifies and describes several theories of ethnic conflict: ethnic security dilemma, status concern, hegemonic ambitions, and elite aspirations. I will discuss these causes in this chapter.

¹⁴ Michael E. Brown, “The International Dimensions of Internal Conflict,” MIT Press 1996, p. 1-31.

¹⁵ Ibid.

¹⁶ Richard Cohen, “Send in the Troops,” Washington Post, November 28, 1995.

¹⁷ Brown, p. 3.

¹⁸ Ibid.

¹⁹ Ibid.

A. ETHNIC SECURITY DILEMMA

All humans have basic needs according to Maslow's Hierarchy of Needs. Safety/security is the most important need, after food, water, and shelter, which are necessary for survival. When there is no overarching authority to provide security for society, people might resort to violence or seek to arm themselves for their survival. This is usually framed in terms of anarchy. Once trust is eroded between parties, they start to mobilize themselves, even in the wake of relatively peaceful periods. Competition often continues to a point at which competing ethnic groups have garnered more power than needed for security, and consequently begin to threaten others.²⁰ This is called the "security dilemma." What one group does to enhance its own security causes a reflective reaction from their adversary or competition that, in the end, can make the group less secure.²¹

When a society falls into the paradox of a security dilemma, ethnic groups who may have lived in harmony for many years under legitimate authority suddenly view each other with suspicion, interpreting each act as a threat. For example, in Yugoslavia, disintegration of central authority led directly to interethnic conflict and destroyed the Balkans while inflicting a large number of human losses throughout the 1990s. It is tempting to blame interethnic hatreds, ancient feuds, and conflicts over identity to explain conflicts within or among the former Yugoslav Republics. But as Michael Ignatief argues, Serbs, Croats and Muslims lived in relative harmony for most of the 20th century. There were high rates of intermarriage, they lived in the same villages, and attended many of the same schools. What turned friends and neighbors into enemies was the power vacuum that emerged with Tito's death. Without central government to ensure order and guarantee personal security, people became afraid. As Ignatief continues, "Once the Yugoslav Communist state began to spin apart into its constituent national particles, a key question soon became: *Will the local Croat policemen protect me if I am a Serb? Will I keep my job in the soap factory if my new boss is a Serb or Muslim?* The answer to these questions was no, because no state remained to enforce the old

²⁰ Barry R. Posen, "The Security Dilemma and Ethnic Conflict," *Survival*, vol.35, no.1, Spring, 1993, p 23-47.

²¹ Ibid.

interethnic bargain.²² Although ethnic differences and distrust played a role in the rise of the conflict, these causes would not have led to full-fledged war without the collapse of authority.

A necessary condition for the ethnic security dilemma to operate among ethnic groups is that they must have a reason to fear one another or at least to be uncertain about other groups' intentions.²³ After all, in theory, a group might welcome armed neighbors if they believed they would fight by their side against other unsavory elements.²⁴ Byman argues that in Lebanon, for example, Sunni Muslim groups did not fear the increasingly armed Palestinian presence in the country, as they believed that the Palestinians would help them fight Christians, Druze, and other Lebanese rivals in the event of a conflict.²⁵

However, a security dilemma is not the only source of conflict. Although I argued previously that many scholars do not welcome “ancient hatreds” as a cause of ethnic strife, it is hard to ignore the past. When societies were built, economic and structural advantages might have been formed not favored of one group over another (e.g., representation in the executive branch). Eventually, social disequilibrium would raise tensions among the different ethnic groups. One of the many factors that fuel social disequilibrium is concern over ethnic status.

B. ETHNIC STATUS CONCERN

The Security dilemma is not the only factor that leads ethnic groups to struggle. One of the prominent causes of conflict is the relative position\status of one group over another. Societies tend to seek equilibrium. People on both sides of the spectrum question what they want from their government and to what they are entitled. If the differences among members of different groups are wide enough to sharpen disequilibrium, people start to question authority. Points of disequilibrium mostly involve recognition of religious and language rights, equal economic opportunity, and political representation.

²² Michael Ignatieff, “Blood and Belonging: Journeys into New Nationalism,” 1993, p.42.

²³ Byman, p.17.

²⁴ Ibid.

²⁵ Ibid.

In the Yugoslavian example, status at the national level was determined by different factors, including the perceived “compatibility” of ethnic groups to the Yugoslav ideal. The RAND²⁶ prepared the following table portraying status stratification within Yugoslavia in the late 1980s for the United States Army.

Ethnic Group	Status
Slovenes	++
Croats	++
Serbs	+
Montenegrins	+
Macedonians	-
Muslims	--
Hungarians	--
Albanians	--
++=High status --=Low status	

Table 1. Status Stratification of the Former Yugoslavia in the 1980s²⁷

The ethnic setup of Yugoslavia and the mechanisms, such as JNA9 (Yugoslav Federal Army), put in place to prevent ethnic conflict did not make the country safer but more susceptible to a violent zero-sum game.²⁸ Each group perceived its relative position to the others and could only improve its position by making other groups worse off.²⁹ This never-ending struggle planted the seeds of instability and rivalry along ethnic lines.

Recognition of the languages and religious rights of ethnic minorities is an important role in the status equation as well. Although it is not a direct life-and-death issue, as with security dilemma, ethnic groups might raise questions and strive for a shift

²⁶ The RAND Corporation is a nonprofit institution that helps improve policy and decision making through research and analysis.

²⁷ Thomas S. Szayna, “Identifying Potential Ethnic Conflict: Application of a Process Model,” RAND Corporation, 2000.

²⁸ Ibid.

²⁹ Ibid.

in status. *Can my children learn and practice my religion? What language will be taught in the school? Why is my language considered inferior to my neighbor's?*³⁰ These legitimate questions might be addressed by the authority or dominant ethnic group but, if they are not, they may take society to the brink of conflict. For example, in Burma, Buddhism was made the official religion. In Sri Lanka, Sinhala was made the official language. Demands for adoption of ethnic symbols such as language and religion were interpreted as a push for a status shift and strongly rejected. Concessions to such demands precipitated secessionist movements by non-Burmans in Burma and ethnic violence in Sri Lanka.

For status concerns to be a cause of ethnic conflict, groups must be able to compare their relative positions to one another.³¹ Unfortunately, there is no metric available for us to gauge when status grievances trigger a conflict. However, political scientist Myron Weiner argues, “Inequalities, real or perceived, are a necessary but not a sufficient condition for ethnic conflict; there must be also competition for control over or access to economic wealth, political power or social status.”³²

C. HEGEMONIC AMBITIONS

According to Byman, another source of ethnic conflict is the hegemonic aspirations of dominant ethnic groups. Although an ethnic group's status and physical safety are not at stake, a majority ethnic group may not be satisfied with that and may seek absolute dominance. For members of these hegemonic groups, only one religion or language—that of the majority—is acceptable.

Dominant ethnic groups driven by hegemonic ambitions are sometimes intrigued with the idea that if they do not win absolute dominance over subordinate groups, they will eventually lose. For example, in Malaysia's Kuala Lumpur in the 1960s, there was a big neon sign atop an office building that read, “Jayakan Bahasa Kebangsaan,” which translated, means, “Glorify the national language,” which, in turn, was understood to

³⁰ Thomas S. Szayna, “Identifying Potential Ethnic Conflict: Application of a Process Model,” RAND Corporation, 2000.

³¹ Byman, p. 24.

³² Myron Weiner, “Bad Neighbors, Bad Neighborhoods: An Inquiry into the Causes of Refugee Flows” International Security 21, (1): 5-42. Summer, 1996.

mean, “Glorify the Malay language,” and, by extension, “Denigrate the other languages,” such as Chinese and English.³³ Dominant ethnic groups within a government might not necessarily be dominant in terms of demographic figures. Malays’ push for linguistic domination hardened the identities of subordinate ethnic groups and fueled their grievances for more than two decades.

The hegemonic aspirations of a dominant ethnic group within a society can result in serious consequences, varying from complete domination of other ethnic minorities to full-fledged ethnic genocide. Even the recognition of political and cultural dominance by other ethnic groups cannot guarantee their survival. In Rwanda, for example, the Belgians reinforced the Tutsi dominance. After the 1960s, when the Belgians granted independence to the Hutu-led government, Hutus blamed the Tutsi minority for every major failure of the central government. Finally, during the late spring and early summer of 1994, almost one million Rwandans were killed by their fellow citizens.³⁴ Not only Tutsis but also moderate Hutus were massacred by militant Hutus, urged on by the government and quasi-official radio stations.³⁵

Hegemonic aspirations are important sources of ethnic conflict. They cause both security concerns and status concerns for ethnic minorities and are very conducive to ethnic manipulation by ethnic leaders. Thus, there are bidirectional relationships between hegemonic aspirations and ethnic leaders. Most of the time ethnic leaders believe that there is more to be gained by playing up hegemonic aspirations than by reducing them.

D. LEADERSHIP AMBITIONS

What do ethnic leaders seek on the brink of a conflict? Some may argue that prevention of conflict would possibly benefit both sides. However, some ethnic leaders might seek to personally benefit from people’s grievances by increasing the likelihood of conflict rather than solving it.

³³ Montville, Joseph “Conflict and Peacemaking in Multiethnic Societies,” 1990, USA: Lexington Books.

³⁴ http://www2.beyondintractability.org/m/addressing_underlying causes.jsp, Accessed on 01 September 2006, Beyond Intractability: A Free Knowledge Base on More Constructive Approaches to Destructive Conflict.

³⁵ Ibid.

Ethnic leaders seek to make ethnicity the dominant political issue in order to increase their own power. Under the conditions of an actual or perceived security dilemma, status concerns, and hegemonic domination, ethnic leaders can produce immediate and profound polarization within the society.

Even where the set of concerns I have discussed are not present, ethnic leaders, along with socio-ethnic pressures, can mobilize society along ethnic lines. In this way, they can even cause previously integrated communities to separate along ethnic lines.³⁶ In framing the issues for the public, ethnic leaders exaggerate the hostility of others and magnify the likelihood of conflict. Another common tactic of ethnic leaders is the solidification of ethnic lines, eventually making a visible differentiation of who stands for whom.³⁷ Then they try to create a “rally round the flag” effect to justify every measure and decision undertaken on behalf of the entire ethnic group.³⁸ During his rise to power, Adolf Hitler repeatedly blamed the Jewish population for Germany’s defeat in World War I and subsequent economic hardships. Then, what began with a simple boycott of Jewish shops ended in the gas chambers at Auschwitz as Adolf Hitler and his Nazi followers attempted to exterminate the entire Jewish population of Europe.

Ethnic leaders might not even tolerate moderate voices within their own movement in times of imminent conflict. In Sri Lanka, the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Elam—one of the most violent movements in the world, which seeks a Tamil state in northern Sri Lanka—regularly assassinate the more moderate Tamil leaders who are willing to compromise with the majority Sinhalese population there.³⁹

E. CONCLUSION

One way to prevent ethnic problems from turning in to full fledged conflict is to understand underlying causes of ethnic conflict. However, understanding causes is not the end but just the beginning of this study. Creating a lasting peace is difficult under the

³⁶David A. Lake and Donald Rothchild, “Containing Fear,” International Security, Vol.21, No. 2, (Autumn 1996), p. 41-75.

³⁷Ibid.

³⁸Ibid.

³⁹Byman, p.37.

best of conditions and impossible when fate and circumstances conspire to keep a conflict likely.⁴⁰ However, although preventing ethnic conflict is a daunting task, it is not impossible.

The four-fold framework developed here addresses causes of potential conflict and is aimed to prevent causes from taking root in the first place. Such a framework suggests a set of policy tools: “population control” “winning hearts and minds,” “strengthening national identity,” and “reengineering the political system.” Each policy tool is supported by models and initiatives, which are derived from ongoing and resolved ethnic conflicts around the world. Furthermore, in order to solidify my argument, I discuss the effects of the implementation or absence of these polices on countries ranging from the United States to Malaysia.

The first tool of the four-fold framework is population control. Providing security through effective population control will prevent an ethnic security dilemma from occurring. Hence, population control is discussed in the next chapter.

⁴⁰Byman, p. 213.

III. POPULATION CONTROL

There is no doubt that there should be some set of principles to control the dynamics of multiethnic societies. Philosophers since the time of Thomas Hobbes have recognized that the threat of government punishment is the essence of civilized society.⁴¹ However, concerns over the fair use of force or the proportionality of punishment can either dampen or fuel the ethnic security dilemma.

Population control addresses the security needs of ethnic minorities. This reduces the need for non-state actors to arm themselves for self-defense against politically dominant ethnic groups. Meanwhile, groups or individuals within the dominant ethnic groups will not seek violence or intimidation because of the possibility of being arrested for their unlawful activities.

A. CONSENSUS VERSUS COERCION MODEL

Arguably, even homogenous and developed societies have not reached ultimate consensus. Multiethnic societies certainly have not. But the level of grievances and the likelihood of violence vary to a considerable degree. In turn, the necessary level of population control varies too.




Figure 1. **Consensus versus Control Model**⁴²

⁴¹ Byman, p.37.

⁴² Model was taken from Guerilla Warfare lecture notes on 24 August 2006. The class is taught by Dr. Gordon McCormick, Professor of Naval Postgraduate School.

Countries [A and B] represented in Figure 1 are assumed to have multiethnic societies. According to this model, the less consensus there is in a country, the more control it will likely impose upon the population to provide security. This model simplifies our understanding in terms of codifying the balance between control and consensus. For example, where there is considerable consensus among the different ethnic groups, as in Switzerland, minimal police action and monitoring of different ethnicities occur. Meanwhile, where there is less consensus among ethnic groups, such as in India and Sri Lanka, there is a need for stronger control. A vacuum in consensus must be compensated by control. In the long run, control can buy time for policymakers to improve conditions for their societies, implement other conciliatory measures, and create new intuitions.

It is difficult to fully grasp ethnic peace in United States without living in and witnessing the diversity of its society. What most people see from abroad is a single nation with different backgrounds and nationalities. In fact, immigrants from all over the world have contributed to the unique character of the United States for over two hundred years.

The United States is a multiethnic society. In 1792, Hector St. John de Crèvecoeur expressed amazement at American's diversity, encompassing people drawn from virtually every European country as well as Africa.⁴³ The question of how diverse people can live cooperatively in multicultural societies is one of the most demanding of our times. Arguably, what most Americans take for granted is actually a complex process involving policymakers and various law enforcement agencies.

For example, the devastating attacks of September 11, 2001, stimulated widespread anxieties over Muslim and Arab minorities in the United States. What everybody feared most was not elevated anger and fear would turn into violence towards minorities. It has not happened so far. The robust law enforcement capability of government to see, monitor, and react to any kind of violent activity prevented

⁴³ http://www.coe.uh.edu/projects/ethnic_america/course_info.html, Accessed on 08 November 2006, Making of Ethnic America, History 3317, University of Huston.

communities from arming themselves against each other. Meanwhile, President Bush's visit to a Washington mosque shortly after September 11 had a temporary positive impact on Arab-American and Muslim-American communities. The scenario would have been totally different in the absence of effective population control.

In recent years, Americans have witnessed the growing demographics and political power of Hispanics. According to census results released in 2004, there are 34 million Hispanics living in the United States, making it for the first time the largest minority in United States. Recently, Los Angles has been the center of a nationwide movement to protest a proposed immigration bill, with over one million unhappy Hispanics taking to the streets.

Los Angles has a considerable history of racial and ethnic conflict, ranging from the “zoot suit riots” of 1943 through the Watts riots of 1965 to the so-called “Rodney King riots” of 1992.⁴⁴ Politics in Los Angles has often reflected this interethnic conflict, from Sam Yorty’s mayoral campaign against the African-American Tom Bradley, which many observers felt was laced with quasi-racist appeals, through the high-intensity contentiousness over busing for school integration in the 1970s and over illegal immigration in the 1990s, to the ethnic rivalries that surfaced in the last mayoral race between James Hahn and Antonio Villaraigosa.⁴⁵

Yet while African-Americans, and Hispanics struggle for more political room in which maneuver, these groups seldom resort to collective violence. The ability of law enforcement agencies to distinguish and punish those who actually commit violence has convinced many to use civilized means to mobilize for their rights instead.

Another Western liberal democracy that simultaneously enjoys the benefits of a multicultural society is Canada. In Canada, ethnic tensions rose in 1970s as more and more French Canadians in Québec started articulating their desire to be recognized as one of the founding nations of Canada.⁴⁶ The English in Québec held economic power, were

⁴⁴ “Assessment of Interethnic Conflict in Los Angeles,” UCLA Center for Study and Resolution of Interethnic Conflict, March 12, 2002.

⁴⁵Ibid.

⁴⁶ Harry V. Herman, “Ethnic Conflicts in Canada and Former Yugoslavia,” 2002.

mostly Protestant, and spoke only English. The French were excluded from economic power, were Catholic, and spoke French although most had to have a working knowledge of English as well.⁴⁷ This led to a further increase in the intensity of the conflict, which became violent with activities of the Front de Libération du Québec (FLQ). Some Québec nationalists considered the situation intolerable and demanded the separation of Québec from Canada.⁴⁸

After the motion to pursue Québec's independence was defeated by an extremely small margin, 50.58 percent to 49.42 percent, on October 30, 1995, there were concerns at all levels of law enforcement that there would be civil disobedience, occupation of public buildings, and violent communal confrontation along ethnic lines. However, highly professional Canadian and Québec security forces appreciated the need to maintain order and social stability and prevent the fears that could mobilize the masses along ethnic faults. In 1991, General John de Chastelain, Commander of the Canadian Armed Forces, stated that "...in any constitutional debate, and in any action that results, the role of the Armed Forces will be a silent one, and that our only involvement will be to assist the police and associated agencies in the maintenance of law and order, should that be necessary."⁴⁹ Furthermore, the police forces of Canada are capable of effective, coordinated, and restrained action, as indicated in the large-scale raid on terrorists carried out in May 1997 by the Québec police.⁵⁰

Far away from the Western hemisphere, another country has placed its fate and survival on the merits of population control. Given the fact that Arabs and Jews have fought four wars since the foundation of the Israeli state in 1948, the question of how Arabs and Jews have lived in relative peace for decades within Israel itself requires further attention.

⁴⁷ Harry V. Herman, "Ethnic Conflicts in Canada and Former Yugoslavia," 2002.

⁴⁸ Harry V. Herman, "The Principal Cause of Every Ethnic Conflict is a Competition for the Control of Status Rewards, Resources and Territory," 2002.

⁴⁹ David E. Schmitt, "Ethnic Structure, Conflict Processes and the Potential for Violence and Accommodation in Canada," Fall 1997, *The Journal of Conflict Studies*.

⁵⁰ Ibid.

At the time of Israel's establishment, the Israeli Arabs numbered about 110,000—about 11 percent of the total Israeli population—and lived under the administration of a military government. There were times when this percentage rose and fell depending upon the rate of Jewish immigration to Israel. Although they have lived for decades under Israeli rule, Arabs have never been fully integrated into society nor have Israelis fully accepted them as citizens. As Sammy Smooha and John Hoffman note, “The two groups exhibit pervasive cultural differences. They differ in all basic values, such as ethnic origin, language, nationality, and family structure.”⁵¹ Despite these differences, conflict between Jews and Arabs within Israel itself stopped after the 1947–49 wars. Israeli Arabs were not a fifth column during the subsequent Arab-Israeli wars nor did they support Palestinian terrorists.⁵²

Since the foundation of the state of Israel, the government has arguably eased the tensions between Jews and Arabs within the country. But, without any doubt, in a highly contagious environment like the Middle East, policymakers somehow convinced both ethnic groups not to take up arms. While Jews felt safer with military might and a overwhelming police presence in their community, Arabs were not intimidated. When a radical communal leader emerged with a radical agenda, he faced criminal charges and was isolated from rest of the Arab population, who were generally in favor of peace. This equilibrium remained steady even after an Israeli Arab blew himself up and caused the deaths of many innocent Jews. Effective population control policies also dissuaded radical Jewish groups from forming unauthorized armed groups to seek revenge. Grievances have never turned to targeting the masses along communal lines.

B. STRUCTURE OF SECURITY FORCES

The formation and composition of security forces are as important as the policy behind the implementation of force. Whether a police force inspires confidence or fear, pride or resentment, depends in part on whether one ethnic group dominates the force and whether it is used to arbitrate among groups or to enforce discriminatory or hegemonic

⁵¹ Byman, p.51.

⁵² Ibid, p. 53.

state policies.⁵³ The best formation is one composed proportionally of all ethnic groups within the state. Furthermore, recruiting local people from varying ethnic communities not only facilitates law enforcement efforts but also increases community cooperation. For example, the Los Angeles Police Department has been devoting considerable effort to recruiting and deploying individuals from all ethnicities to ensure that they are all represented and respected.

However, certain ethnic groups may not be willing to contribute to the security structure. This is a concern that requires further attention. People may not want to join an organization that is, in their view, unjust or not fair. More dangerously, individuals who are willing to serve in the security force may face hostility from their own community. This is what we have seen happening in Iraq. After the fall of the Saddam regime, the Sunni minority has been lagging when it has come not only joining the security forces but also the political system. Moreover, the few who have volunteered have been targeted by the rest of the Sunni insurgency. At the same time, without Sunni participation, security forces have generated more resentment against the central government in Sunni-dominated neighborhoods.

C. CONCLUSION

No function of government is more sensitive than physical law enforcement. A regulation or law perceived as unjust may alienate an ethnic group, but a bullet that kills a mother, a child, or an ethnic leader will enrage it, even if fired by mistake. Even the restrained arrest and physical removal of defiant lawbreakers from their homes or businesses will infuriate people. If the soldiers or police officers are from the other ethnic group, the anger will be directed at all the other members of that group, not just their political and security forces. Once violence reaches a certain point, efforts to contain it actually contribute to escalation. In 2000, the Israeli shooting of Arab demonstrators supporting the “Al Aqsa” intifada enraged the Israeli Arab community, highlighting their second-class status.⁵⁴

⁵³ Byman, p. 72.

⁵⁴Ibid, p.75.

Nothing can turn good citizens against government more quickly than military or police forces that treat populations differently along ethnic lines. Therefore, all ethnic groups should be proportionally represented in the security structure.

Finally, the primary objective of effective population control is to prevent the *ethnic* security dilemma from mobilizing dormant masses. Thus, control itself is not an end but the just the beginning of the four-fold model. Once security is no longer a main concern of the population, governmental policies should be tailored to embrace all ethnic groups and reconcile their grievances. One way to build more consensus is to win the “hearts and minds” of the people. This effort requires both psychological and structural initiatives. These initiatives are discussed in following chapter.

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IV. WINNING HEARTS AND MINDS

“That nauseating term I think I invented”

— Sir Gerald Templar, when referring to the term “hearts and minds” fifteen years after Malayan Emergency.⁵⁵

Ethnic peace cannot be maintained solely by population control policies. There are many examples of long-lasting empires that achieved relative stability by might rather than through the consent of the governed. Yet efforts to achieve stability thorough coercion and control cannot be considered legitimate and long lasting. Therefore, governments should use a range of initiatives to win the support of the ethnic groups.

I made a case in Chapter II that ethnic conflict is about people, their grievances, and the struggle for power. These concerns must be addressed at the grassroots level. Although co-opting ethnic minorities certainly brings reasonable stability and peace, how long can people be co-opted? A year? A decade?

Because of this, winning people’s hearts and minds is a primary objective of building consensus over time. To win the hearts and minds of minorities in multiethnic societies, I propose two sets of initiatives that are derived from the broad research of the literature. These are psychological initiatives and structural initiatives.

A. PSYCHOLOGICAL INITIATIVES

How people think and feel about their ethnicity and about their relative position in society compared to other ethnic groups is a part of the solution in maintaining ethnic peace. Manipulating psychological expectations and providing understanding would be helpful in easing tensions. The psychological needs, such as security, status concern, and recognition can be satisfied through assurance. Of course, good intentions alone will not necessarily be enough to establish sustainable peace and prevent ethnic conflict.

The psychological initiatives I propose here include recognition, equal justice, and leadership. These are the three pillars of winning the hearts and minds of ethnic

⁵⁵ Stubbs, Richard, “Hearts and Minds in Guerrilla Warfare: The Malayan Emergency, 1948-1960,” 1989, Oxford University Press, p. 6.

minorities. Also, they support the structural initiatives, which are then built upon the success of the psychological initiatives. Figure 2 demonstrates the foundation of this model.




Figure 2. **Psychological and Structural Initiatives**

1. Recognition

The idea of diverse and multiethnic societies has often been regarded as untenable, detrimental to national unity, and a source of conflict within the state. This false perception sometimes leads policymakers to ignore the fact that different ethnic groups are coexisting within the society. In some extreme cases, this false perception has led to policies of forced assimilation, suppression of ethnic identities, and even, in some instances, ethnic cleansing and genocide.

In reality, there is no real tradeoff between recognizing diversity and maintaining peace and stability. Policymakers should recognize that multiple identities can coexist and reinforce each other. For example, an individual living in a country but speaking another language and practicing another religion can still contribute to the well being of his\her country. Therefore, I strongly argue that *recognition* of ethnic differences by government is the first and foremost initiative towards ethnic peace.

During the Franco era in Spain, policies toward cultural, ethnic, and linguistic minorities were directed at the suppression of all non-Spanish diversity and at the

unification, integration, and homogenization of the country.⁵⁶ This fueled grievances among the Catalans, Basques, and Galicians.⁵⁷ With the restoration of democracy in 1978, Spain amended its constitution to recognize and guarantee the autonomy of the nationalities and regions that comprise it and the solidarity among them. This initiative actually started the process of reconciliation of differences between the government of Spain and the ethnic groups and finally succeeded in bringing ethnic peace to the country.

As in Spain, India has a highly complex and colorful social mosaic. Yet, although characterized by vast cultural diversity and heterogeneity, this mosaic is not chaotic.⁵⁸ It has a clearly discernible pattern, wherein socio-cultural diversity draws its strength and sustenance from India's composite culture and civilizational thrust.⁵⁹ On the flip side of the coin, it was not an easy process to reach consensus among eight major ethnicities comprising over one billion people.

No “ethnic” conflict in India has been more traumatic than the one involving the Punjab, the “homeland” of the Sikhs, who make up some 55 to 60 percent of the local population.⁶⁰ At least twenty thousand people have died in political violence there since 1981. Distrust between the Hindu government and the Sikhs peaked in June 1984, when the army besieged Amritsar’s Golden Temple, the major Sikh shrine, alienating most Sikhs from the government. Later, India realized that detrimental and coercive governmental policies were doing nothing but fueling the conflict and granted more rights and recognized its ethnic minorities.⁶¹ Constitutional changes provided recognition and protection and brought guarantees for all ethnic groups.

It is remarkable that where these minority identities have been given due recognition, as in the cases of Belgium, Spain, or India, citizens claimed as much

⁵⁶ <http://countrystudies.us/spain/36.htm>, Accessed on 18 September 2006. This website contains the on-line versions of books previously published in hard copy by the Federal Research Division of the Library of Congress as part of the Country Studies

⁵⁷ Ibid.

⁵⁸ <http://www.unu.edu/unupress/unupbooks/uu12ee/uu12ee0j.htm>, Accessed on 18 September 2006, “Ethnic conflict, federalism, and democracy in India,” S.D. Muni, United Nations University Press

⁵⁹ Ibid.

⁶⁰ Robert L. Hardgrave, “The Challenge of Ethnic Conflict India: The Dilemmas of Diversity” Journal of Democracy Vol. 4, No. 4 October 1993, p. 54-68.

⁶¹ Ibid.

affiliation to their national identities as to their ethnic ones. Recognizing and respecting diversity strengthens, rather than weakens the state.⁶²

2. Equal Justice

What would be the best way to create ethnic harmony in multiethnic societies? A simple but striking idea was stated clearly in Martin Luther King's famous speech delivered in August 1963 in Washington, DC:

“I have a dream that my four little children will one day live in a nation where they will not be judged by the color of their skin but by the content of their character.”

Justice is a complex concept with substantive and symbolic economic, social, legal, and psychological meanings.⁶³ It may be retributive, distributive, restorative, or legal justice.⁶⁴ In this study, I refer to legal justice as a tool for providing equal treatment for everyone before the law. Legal justice entails making and implementing decisions according to fair processes. People will feel affirmed if the procedures that are adopted treat them with respect and dignity, making it easier to accept even outcomes they do not like.⁶⁵

Where the government is dominated by the representatives of one ethnic group, other ethnic groups will tend to suspect or speculate about the fairness of the legal procedures. But what makes legal justice fair? First of all, decisions should be neutral and impartial regardless of ethnicity. This is a must-have condition for any fair legal system to function. Sometimes even the Western-type full-fledged democracies are accused of not implementing impartial legal procedures.

On Sunday, January 30, 1972, thirteen civil rights protestors were shot to death by members of 2nd Battalion of the British Parachute Regiment in Derry, Northern Ireland. According to many eyewitness accounts, including bystanders and journalists, all of the

⁶² Arunabha Ghosh, “Cultural Liberty in Today’s Diverse World,” Human Development Report, 2004.

⁶³ Wendy Lamourne, “Post-Conflict Peace Building: Meeting Human Needs for Justice and Reconciliation,” Peace, Conflict and Development, Issue 4, April 2004.

⁶⁴ Ibid.

⁶⁵ Morton Deutch, “Justice and Conflict,” The Handbook of Conflict Resolution: Theory and Practice, 2000.

protestors were unarmed.⁶⁶ Immediately after the incident, known as Bloody Sunday ever since, the British government held an inquiry to investigate the happenings. Later, the Widgery Tribunal, appointed by the British government, found the soldiers not guilty and cleared the British authorities. Although the Irish Republican Army (IRA) campaign started before Bloody Sunday, obviously the incident itself and the legal fiasco in its aftermath deepened the grievances among Protestants and Catholics and boosted the status of the IRA as well as its recruitment.⁶⁷

Lastly, the legal justice process should be transparent and ethnic groups should be represented in the legal decision-making process. The psychosocial theorists also believe that legal justice is the primary factor associated with the public's perceptions of the legitimacy of the justice system.⁶⁸ Legal theorists likewise agree that legal justice is a necessary component of any legal system and is the cornerstone for the legitimacy of governmental systems.⁶⁹

3. Leadership Behavior

Both national and local government leaders are highly visible in their societies. Their attitudes towards different ethnicities can make a great contribution to maintaining peace and winning hearts and minds. I explore leadership behavior in two dimensions: *top-level leadership* and *grassroots leadership*.⁷⁰ Both of them are equally important but they differ in the size of their target audience. Figure 3 demonstrates top-level and grassroots leaders and their respective behaviors.

⁶⁶ http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Bloody_Sunday_%281972%29, Accessed on 18 September 2006, The Wikipedia Online Library.

⁶⁷ Ibid.

⁶⁸ Lind, E Allan; Tyler, Tom, "The Social Psychology of Procedural Justice," 1988, Plenum Press, New York, USA.

⁶⁹ Ibid.

⁷⁰ John Paul Lederach, "Building Peace: Sustainable Reconciliation in Divided Societies," 1994, p.38.




Figure 3. **Top-Level and Grassroots Leadership⁷¹**

a. Top-Level Leadership

Top-level leadership includes national government, political party leaders, and high-ranking military leaders. They are the highest representatives of government and, due to lots of press coverage and air time, their attitudes toward ethnic problems resonate among the millions in a single day.⁷² On the other hand, while top leaders benefit from high visibility, their statements also carry enormous weight.

However, in multiethnic nations, government leaders are under constant pressure to maintain relatively dominant positions and constituencies. In the meantime, they are responsible for the ultimate security and well being of the entire population. Given those facts, what should they do to win the hearts and minds of millions?

First of all, many leaders perceive that an emotional public speech or an effective public relations campaign would bring thousands aboard. Although a few people might come aboard, they tend to get off at the next stop if the speech or campaign is not supported by reliable policies. Generally, newly elected leaders bring new hopes. They start the game with one hundred points and they begin to lose points along the way. Thus, they must not *offend* the religious, linguistic, or cultural values of ethnic groups. Secondly, they should *participate in and embrace* important days\festivals on behalf of entire nation.

⁷¹ John Paul Lederach, "Building Peace: Sustainable Reconciliation in Divided Societies," 1994, p.38.

⁷² Ibid.

National leaders are there for promoting shared values rather than differences. They need to reassure all ethnic groups and build more trust, hopefully increasing mutual consensus across the country. Besides those things, they should contact the leaders of minority ethnic groups and prevent them from drifting towards more radical courses of action that are likely to bring nothing but pain.

b. Grassroots Leadership

Leadership at this level is based on face-to-face communication and day-to-day efforts to gain and maintain support for an overarching policy. But who are grassroots leaders? In fact, they are community leaders, local security officials, and local government officials. In other words, they are the ones who operate at the ground zero of ethnic groups.

In many instances, local-level misconduct by a local-level official may turn out to create a major confrontation along ethnic lines. Thus, local officials need to address the concerns and expectations of individuals. This can be achieved by the immediate availability of governmental services, such as schools, health services, roads, and security forces. People in a remote village should be reached for and grasped by the warm hands of government protection. Grassroots leaders are the ones who will provide and fairly distribute already scarce resources among those people.

Furthermore, grassroots leaders should be accustomed to the way of life in their area and appreciate local's distinct culture. In some countries, when local officials are sent to rural areas, where ethnic fault lines are more visible than in the cosmopolitan cities, they tend to live in Middle Ages-style castles built like small cities and do not interact with the local population.

Finally, as it is in business and industry, proactive leadership makes a significant difference in the management of ethnic conflict. In this kind of long-lasting struggle, both top-level and grassroots leaders have unique roles to play. More importantly, to what extent they become successful will define the level of cooperation between ethnic groups and government.

B. STRUCTURAL INITIATIVES

Structural initiatives are designed to address disequilibrium between ethnic groups' expectations and state policies. Policies for correcting disequilibrium can be interpreted as a form of affirmative action. In that regard, I discuss three major structural initiatives. These are economic, educational, and cultural initiatives. I selected these three initiatives because, without bridging the disequilibrium between an ethnic group's economic, cultural, language expectations and reality, no governmental policy will maintain support in the long term.

1. Economic Initiative

Ethnic groups, particularly when concentrated in one part of the country, may tend to believe that the government is punishing them by deliberately depriving them of resources and investments that the rest of the population enjoys. However, investors tend to avoid risky environments in which company lives and property are threatened.⁷³ The unwillingness of private companies to invest capital in such regions cannot be a legitimate reason for a government to blame either ethnic minorities or entrepreneurs.

According to Francis Stewart, there are three types of policy that may be adopted to achieve greater group equality in economic entitlements.⁷⁴ Firstly, governments can change policies towards processes that are biased toward a particular ethnic group. Secondly, the state can provide direct assistance to particular groups, such as subsidizing housing and providing job training. Lastly, governments can introduce targets and quotas for educational, financial, and physical assets.

These policies have been used as a package or individually by many different governments all around the world. Two of the most successful examples, Malaysia and Northern Ireland, illustrate how these policies can contribute to reducing economic inequalities and supporting peace. Until 1969, Malaysia experienced large annual growth rates of about six percent per annum, but this benefited the urban-based Chinese and other non-Malay communities more than the native Malays, who made up about 47

⁷³ David Horowitz, "Ethnic Groups in Conflict," 1985, p. 583.

⁷⁴ Francis Stewart, "Policies toward Horizontal Inequalities in Post-Conflict Reconstruction," 2002.

percent of the population.⁷⁵ Following riots in 1969, a symptom of growing ethnic tension, the governing Alliance party introduced a New Economic Policy (NEP), which attempted to distribute the benefits of growth more widely. This involved setting job quotas to encourage the recruitment of more Malay workers at all levels of industry and finance. As a result of NEP, income imbalances declined and more Malays were employed in non-agricultural work. Perhaps as a result of these policies, direct ethnic violence has not been common in Malaysia.⁷⁶

As in Malaysia, sharp economic disequilibrium among Catholics and Protestants in Northern Ireland was an important factor behind the outbreak of violence in the 1970s.⁷⁷ The British government implemented two fair employment acts, first in 1976 and again in 1989, which greatly reduced employment discrimination.⁷⁸ Inequalities in income and housing also declined within a decade. The success of these policies was believed to be a factor in explaining why the Catholic community was prepared to stop violent action.⁷⁹

2. Educational Initiative

An education initiative is a key criterion in preventing conflict in multiethnic societies. It will bring hope, opportunity, a sense of belonging, and recognition for all ethnic groups. Also, educating ethnic masses may prevent them from being manipulated or provoked by radicals

An education initiative, in a relatively short time, can bring together many people with different ethnic backgrounds and change the composition of student bodies. The Malaysian government began to pay close attention to the ethnic composition of the university student bodies and its constitution was eventually amended to permit the government to control the university admission rates of Malays.

⁷⁵ Horowitz, p.584.

⁷⁶David Horowitz, “Ethnic Groups in Conflict,” 1985.

⁷⁷ Francis Stewart, “Policies toward Horizontal Inequalities in Post-Conflict Reconstruction,” 2002.

⁷⁸ Ibid.

⁷⁹ Ibid.

Like Malaysia, the Tamil movement in Sri Lanka was at its peak in the 1970s. A new wave of violence claimed the lives of many policemen and soldiers.⁸⁰ A new admissions system, which introduced certain benefits to favor of Tamils confused hardcore Tamils who expected no equal treatment with the Sinhalese majority.⁸¹ The government went one step further and opened a new campus in Jaffna, in the Tamil heartland.⁸² Overall, education initiatives played a role in lessening the grievances and dampening the conflict in Sri Lanka.

Soon after the collapse of apartheid, the new government in South Africa set about restructuring the educational system that had previously been segregated by race, class, and language. The *de-racialization and integration* of schools in South Africa has been straightforward and the design of the educating system has provided a medium for integrating ethnic, class, and language divisions. In accordance with the new governmental policies, schools have adopted policies for widening access to learners of other cultural and linguistic groups. This integration and participation maximizes mutual consensus.

3. Cultural Initiative

What rights and symbolic dignity are accorded by the state to a group's language or to its religious beliefs and practices? The answer to this question rests at the heart of an effective cultural initiative. Cultural policies are an important aspect of group grievances and, consequently, of governmental policies. Such policies should aim to correct cultural exclusion and discrimination.⁸³

Language is a critical issue in many multiethnic states. Any structural policy that does not address language issues will not be sufficiently inclusive. Belgium is a great example of reaching consensus via a language initiative. Belgium was deeply divided between Flemish-speaking Flanders and French-speaking Wallonia in the 1950s and 1960s. In 1971, the constitution was amended with a new article that stipulated that both French and Flemish were official languages of Belgium and the government was required

⁸⁰ David Horowitz, "Ethnic Groups in Conflict," 1985.

⁸¹ Ibid.

⁸² David Horowitz, "Ethnic Groups in Conflict," 1985.

⁸³ Francis Stewart, "Policies toward Horizontal Inequalities in Post-Conflict Reconstruction," 2002.

to ensure education in both languages. Along with equal political participation and recognition, the language initiative considerably eased tensions and led the way for Belgium to become the headquarters of multicultural organizations such as NATO and the European Union.

Along with language and religion, ceremonies and symbols occupy an important space in the formation of ethnic culture. Among the many examples are the sites of religious buildings in India and Israel as well as the Orange parades in Northern Ireland, which mark Protestant Prince William of Orange's victory over the Catholic King James II at the Battle of Boyne.⁸⁴

The impact of cultural initiatives on winning hearts and minds is undeniable. Dimitrijevics argues that cultural initiatives and policies aimed at cultural aspects have been more important than either political or economic policies.⁸⁵ Hence, policymakers should not leave the cultural domain of ethnic groups in the hands of radicals and ethno-nationalists. They need to regulate cultural disequilibrium and build consensus over time.

C. CONCLUSION

In this chapter, I have proposed a “hearts-and-minds” campaign model for maintaining ethnic peace in multiethnic nations. The necessity of such a campaign derives from the disequilibrium between the psychological and structural expectations of ethnic groups and government policies. Thus, governmental policies need to correct psychological expectations, such as recognition, equal justice, and the behavior of the leadership, as well as eliminate structural inequalities, such as economic, educational, and cultural imbalances. Although such initiatives are likely to produce resistance from dominant ethnic groups who are losing some privileges, they have been proven to provide moderation and peace in countries like Northern Ireland, Malaysia, and Belgium. Additional language and education policies are discussed in more detail as tools of identity-hardening in Chapter V.

⁸⁴ Francis Stewart, “Policies toward Horizontal Inequalities in Post-Conflict Reconstruction,” 2002.

⁸⁵ A. Dimitrijevics, “Integrating Patterns of Conflict Resolution: A Group Oriented Approach to the Study of the Genesis and Dynamics of Conflict,” 2004, Unpublished M. Phil., Oxford University, Oxford.

Another tool of the four-fold framework is strengthening national identity. In today's world, multiethnic states are increasingly the norm. Hence, governments around the world, varying from the democratic to the totalitarian, are engaging in identity-hardening campaigns by direct or indirect means. Although identity-building tools like education, religion, language, and promulgation of national symbols can be divisive in multiethnic societies, through the implementation of correct governmental policies, they can also be indispensable tools for building a cohesive national identity.

V. STRENGTHENING NATIONAL IDENTITY

“Unus pro omnibus, omnes pro uno”⁸⁶

Despite the reality of national diversity, belief in the importance of the nation-state still persists.⁸⁷ This need not entail a denial of the fact of national diversity but instead can involve the assertion that the state can only be stable if it is held together—unified by people’s sense of belonging to a single, strong, national identity.⁸⁸ Although many attempts at establishing strong national unity have resulted in bloodshed or rebellion, over the course of history a large number of nation-states have achieved national unity in a positive sense.

In 1698, when the Peace of Westphalia inaugurated the era of the nation-state, many of the states that exist today were collections of dialect groups that had little in common with their neighbors.⁸⁹ For example, France had to transform a region of French, Celtic, German, Flemish, Basque, Spanish, and Italian groups into the ethnically homogenous France of today.⁹⁰ When Italy was unified in 1870, only a small portion of the population spoke Italian. As Massimo d’Azeglio famously observed, “We have made Italy; now we must make Italians.”⁹¹

Again, how some multiethnic nations have reached a national consensus to live peacefully side-by-side and maintain considerable unity is worthy of further exploration. Many governments around the world have engaged in nation building in an attempt to join formerly disparate and rival people into one nation.⁹² Such efforts often involve a combination of legal changes that contrive to blur or obliterate ethnic status through

⁸⁶ Latin phrase that means “*One for all, all for one*” in English. It is known as the motto of Alexander Dumas’ Three Musketeers and is also the traditional motto of Switzerland.

⁸⁷ Alex, J. Smith, “The Possibility of Stability in Nationally Diverse States,” 2002, p. 128.

⁸⁸ Ibid.

⁸⁹ Daniel B. Byman, “Keeping the Peace: Lasting Solutions to Ethnic Conflicts,” 2002, p.105.

⁹⁰ Eugen Joseph Weber, “Peasants into Frenchmen: The Modernization of Rural France,” 1976, Stanford University Press, USA, p.122.

⁹¹ Daniel B. Byman, “Keeping the Peace: Lasting Solutions to Ethnic Conflicts,” 2002, p.105.

⁹² Ibid.

regulations forbidding certain types of dress, schooling in a common language with a common curriculum, and the promulgation of national symbols (flag, anthem, and heroes) that unify residents.⁹³

In this thesis, educational and linguistic policies, the promulgation of national symbols, and religion are discussed as tools that might be pursued by governments seeking national unity. The goals of these policies are not to destroy sub-identities but to strengthen an overarching national identity. Hence, the goal of national unity should not be to impose common identities on deeply divided peoples but to organize a social and political life that can allow people to live together despite their differences.

A. EDUCATION POLICIES

With respect to national identity and ethnic groups, an educational policy plays an important role in the integration of plural societies. Educational institutions are the very first places where young generations ask questions and search for answers. Questions like “Who am I?” or “What do national symbols such as songs, flags, and heroes tell me and others about my identity?” are answered.

Many countries have used some form of a national education policy. Even though the intentions may vary with different countries, any national education policy indicates an intent to homogenize the constituent members comprising a multiethnic nation. Education plays a fundamental role in building a sense of belonging and self-awareness within different ethnic identities.

Countries like Turkey and Malaysia applied common national educational policies toward integrating their plural societies. The end of World War I marked the end of a six-century reign for the multiethnic Ottoman Empire. It also triggered a war of independence for people living in Anatolia that resulted in the Turkish Revolution. Following the revolution, Turkey inherited a three-headed educational system. The survival of the young republic could not be sustained by maintaining that heritage.

The educational institutions were far from being national before the revolution. The schools were structured in three main channels as horizontal institutions, closed to each other. The first and most common one was local schools and medreses, based on

⁹³ Daniel B. Byman, “Keeping the Peace: Lasting Solutions to Ethnic Conflicts,” 2002, p.105.

memorizing the Qur'an in Arabic. The second was the reformist schools of Tanzimat, called idadî and Sultanî.⁹⁴ The third were the schools educating in foreign languages, like colleges and minority schools. In these three channels, three different opinions, three different life styles, and even three different peoples of different eras were being educated.

Within this atmosphere, it was possible to raise generations that accepted national sovereignty as a lifestyle, were willing to strengthen national culture, and could attain national unity connected via these three educational channels. Within the transformation process, radical measures were taken and the Law on Unification of National Education No. 430 was put into force on March 3, 1924. Through this law, the three channels were merged.⁹⁵ The medreses were closed, the reformist schools of Tanzimat were developed, and those educating in foreign languages were put under the control and custody of the Ministry of National Education.

During the transition from Ottoman Empire to Turkish Republic, education policies were vital in creating a national consensus and the Turkish national identity. The reunification of education in the 1920s was a major pillar in the creation of a secular modern state.

As a former British colony with substantial ethnic Indian and Chinese minorities, Malaysia searched for a national identity after achieving independence from Britain in 1957. Malaysia, like Turkey, has tried to establish a national identity mainly through language and education. According to Tun Abdul Razak, the second Prime Minister of Malaysia, who headed the country from 1970 to 1976, the main objective of the education policies was not outright cultural assimilation but, rather, a process of integration by mutual adjustment of diverse cultural and social traits, acceptable to all races in the country.⁹⁶

Before the bloody riots of 1969, there was no national education policy in Malaysia. There was widespread suspicion about the agenda of Chinese schools in the

⁹⁴ http://www.meb.gov.tr/Stats/apk2001ing/Section_3/1TransformationMotivated.htm. Accessed 02 September 2006, The Turkish Ministry Of Education Official Website.

⁹⁵ Ibid.

⁹⁶ R. S. Milne, "Politics in Ethnically Bipolar States," 1981, p.12.

country. When education first became a genuine national issue, a principal concern was to ensure Malaysian internal security.⁹⁷ The nationalization of education and the unification of the existing polyglot schools were considered mandatory if the young regime was to guarantee the nation's integrity against the threats of subversion. Although subsequent governments in Kuala Lumpur had fears about subversive activities under Chinese schools, they continuously adopted new initiatives toward strengthening genuine Malaysian national unity and its requisites.⁹⁸

In the 1980s, a New Economic Policy (NEP) was initiated. Education was given a central role in the development strategy formulated by the NEP because it was believed that educational development affects the nation in many vital aspects. Malaysian policymakers regarded it as a vehicle for modernizing society and attaining social goals, equal opportunities, and national unity.⁹⁹

A number of educational policies, created to build a genuine Malaysian identity, promote national values, and teach the national language, are still operating. Furthermore, it seems like almost a half-century's effort to build national unity has paid off. Although there are debates over economic disequilibrium among different ethnic groups, there is significant consensus regarding common Malaysian values and identity.

B. LANGUAGE AND NATIONAL IDENTITY

The worldwide problem of language and identity comes from the fact that, whereas there are more than 200 sovereign states, there are more than 2000 forms of written language.¹⁰⁰ This astonishing reality makes it clear that language policies implemented by governments in multiethnic societies can be either a barrier to or the glue for social integration.

Language is important both as a communication medium and as the basis of national thinking in the formation of a national consciousness. Throughout history, languages have been an indispensable tool for nation building. Working toward the

⁹⁷ Cynthia H. Enloe, "Issues and Integration in Malaysia" Pacific Affairs, Vol. 41, No. 3. (Autumn, 1968), p. 372-385.

⁹⁸ Ibid.

⁹⁹ Ibid.

¹⁰⁰ William R. Beer, "Language policy and National Unity," 1985, p.3.

unification of Germany in the late eighteenth century, social thinkers such as T. G Herder emphasized a primordial phenomenon of nationhood.

During the second half of the last century, a significant number of governments had to create comprehensive language policies for their nations. Canada, the United States, Belgium, Finland, Spain, and France are some of the countries on a long list. Whereas some of the countries mentioned above had similar approaches, like Sweden, Belgium, and Canada, France had different incentives. Here, I briefly describe what policies they put in place to maintain national unity within the boundaries of ethnic peace.

One way to promote national unity is to grant constitutional rights to the different ethnic identities. The bilingual policy of the Canadian government reassured the territorially based francophone population in Québec. While Canadian elites favor a bilingual Canada, elites in Québec insist on a unilingual Québec. As in Canada, language has always been a source of conflict in Belgium. The situation there is characterized not only by a complexity of regional dialects, but especially by the official institution of three different languages: Dutch, French, and German. All three have been recognized as official languages of the country.

Another way to promote national unity is to recognize the languages of ethnic minorities while still promoting, an overarching national language. Spain is one of the most linguistically varied states in Western Europe. There are three major ethnic identities and languages. They are Castilian in Catalan, Basque in the Basque region, and Gallego in Galicia. However, Spanish is the only national language that is favored by the government. Among the three regional languages, the prospects for Gallego are not bright due to a low level of ethnic consciousness and a lack of commitment to it.¹⁰¹

However, the United States, with considerable ethnic minorities, has a different recipe. In the United States, a Vietnamese can take a written driving test in his/her language, a Mexican can work and sustain a family without speaking English, and a Chinese can publish and read a newspaper in his language. English cannot be described as an official language and it has no official federal status in the United States.

¹⁰¹ William R. Beer, “Language policy and National Unity,” 1985, p.101.

Different language policies have been implemented by different nations. It is hard to tell which ones are best. The intent here is not to rank the countries in terms of language policies but to demonstrate that language is an issue in the formation of national identity.

C. PROMULGATION OF NATIONAL SYMBOLS

National symbols provide perhaps the strongest and clearest statement of national identity. In essence, they serve as modern totems that bear a special relationship to the nation they represent, distinguishing them from others and reaffirming identity boundaries.¹⁰² Since the inception of nations, national leaders have embraced and adopted national symbols to create bonds, motivate patriotic action, honor the efforts of citizens, and legitimize formal authority.¹⁰³

Immediately after the 9/11 attacks on the World Trade Center and the Pentagon, all Americans, regardless of ethnicity or religion, rallied around the flag, one of the strongest national symbols. Two pictures taken during the rescue operations resonated all around the world. Those photographs portray firefighters, soldiers, and civilians raising the national flag as a statement of resilience and loyalty to their country. This was similar what occurred two generations ago, when the US was at war and Associated Press photographer Joe Rosenthal snapped a picture of five Marines and a Navy Corpsman raising “Old Glory” on Mount Suribachi on the Pacific island of Iwo Jima in February 1945.¹⁰⁴ The photo became a WW II icon and the basis for the Marine Corps memorial sculpture overlooking Washington, D.C. The Battle of Iwo Jima also is recognized as the beginning of the end of the campaign against the Japanese in the Pacific.

¹⁰² Karen A. Cerulo, “Symbols and the World System: National Anthems and Flags,” Sociological Forum, Vol. 8, No. 2, June 1993, p. 243-271.

¹⁰³ Ibid.

¹⁰⁴ <http://septterror.tripod.com/firephoto.html> Accessed September 18, 2006, Icons: The Photo Seen 'Round the World.



Figure 4. Firefighters Raising the American Flag at the Pentagon and in the Rubble of the World Trade Center

The proliferation of the American flag right after the 9/11 attacks was a stark visual example of how we instinctively look to the symbols of national identity in reaction to a national attack.¹⁰⁵ Furthermore, a greater surprise was how much the Twin Towers were apparently counted as a national symbol even for Americans living thousands of miles away from New York, who had never visited the city, and who normally think of it as embodying values quite opposite to their own.¹⁰⁶

Many multiethnic nations do not have as many national symbols of unity as the United States. For example, in Malaysia, there have been few national symbols that would appeal to all groups of the population.¹⁰⁷ The main governmental symbols were predominantly Malay. Consequently, the concept of national identity tended to be emotionally empty to the Chinese and other non-Malayan ethnicities.¹⁰⁸ Apart from governmental symbols, hardly any other symbols could be found, which would evoke

¹⁰⁵ John E. Joseph, "Language and Identity," 2004, p.93

¹⁰⁶ Ibid.

¹⁰⁷ Milne, R.S, "Politics in Ethnically Bipolar States"1981 p.127.

¹⁰⁸ Ibid.

favorable responses from all ethnic groups.¹⁰⁹ For example, due to Malaysia's lack of national symbols, the king, as the symbol of the state as well as of Malay political hegemony, could ostracize other ethnic groups. Consequently, Malaysia produced a group of national symbols to which the entire nation contributes and can be proud of. Malaysia's economic products and infrastructure provide national logos for the country: Proton, the national car; Petronas Towers, the world's tallest buildings; and Malaysia Airlines have all come to symbolize the modern Malaysia.¹¹⁰ The government's slogan, "Malaysia Boleh!" (Malaysia Can!), is meant to encourage even greater accomplishments for future generations.¹¹¹

The promulgation of national symbols, such as a national anthem, a national flag, liberators, and great personalities, has been adopted by many governments to convey a national identity. However, ethnically divided nations inherently have a hard time producing symbols that embrace all ethnic groups. In such circumstances, producing new national symbols rather than enforcing those that represent the dominant ethnic group would be more useful for forming or creating a national identity.

D. RELIGION AND NATIONAL IDENTITY

Strengthening national identity through religion is another notable way to achieve cohesion in multiethnic states. Because religion promotes brotherhood among believers and encourages them to seek unified communities, not only ethnic groups but also various nationalities throughout history have rallied around religious symbols and have fought holy wars and jihads.

There are mainly two schools of thought to explain the interaction between national identity and religion.¹¹² They are modernization theory and social cohesion theory. The one more closely related to my argument is modernization theory. According to this theory, the role of religion is one of the distinguishing marks between traditional

¹⁰⁹ R. S. Milne, "Politics in Ethnically Bipolar States," 1981, p.127.

¹¹⁰ <http://www.everyculture.com/Ja-Ma/Malaysia.html>. Accessed 23 November 2006, Countries and Their Cultures; The Malaysia Forum.

¹¹¹ Ibid.

¹¹² Lilly Weissbrod, "Religion as National Identity in a Secular Society," Review of Religious Research, Vol. 24, No. 3. (Mar., 1983), p. 188-205.

and modern societies.¹¹³ In traditional societies, where religion is a major cohesive force, a value system is unquestioningly accepted by all members due to its sacredness.¹¹⁴ Since, religion does not play an important role in modern societies where cohesion is based on secular values, such as democracy, equality, and freedom. This argument may not hold for every single case. However, there are many modern countries where religion and national identity are so intermingled that they cannot be differentiated.

Israel represents a great example of this. Israel is unique in that it is the only country in which Judaism is the religion of a majority of its citizens. In this manner, national identity is built around religious identity. For Jews, religion includes not only an exclusive belief but also a unique tradition, a distinct language, and a remarkable history. Any attempt to define Israeli national identity on a secular basis has been questioned by the Jewish majority. Further reflecting the strong bond between religious and national identity in Israel, since Judaism is a religion, is that one can only become a Jew by religious conversion, which, in turn facilitates obtaining Israel citizenship.¹¹⁵ On the other hand, Jews in Israel who convert to other religions do not thereby lose Israeli citizenship, although their national identity certainly might be questioned.¹¹⁶ Hence, although it is a modern secular state in the heart of the Middle East, even Israel has not been able reconcile the inherent contradiction between secular values and Jewish heritage in defining its national identity.

Other than Israel, a number of states in the Middle East have placed religion in the center when creating a national identity. In fact, with the exception of Turkey, all of the countries of the Middle East have opted for a religion-centric identity.¹¹⁷ In some cases,

¹¹³ Lilly Weissbrod, “Religion as National Identity in a Secular Society,” *Review of Religious Research*, Vol. 24, No. 3. (Mar., 1983), p. 188-205.

¹¹⁴ Ibid.

¹¹⁵ http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Nation#Common_religion. Accessed 12 October 2006, The Wikipedia Online Dictionary.

¹¹⁶ Ibid.

¹¹⁷ P R Kumaraswamy “Who Am I? The Identity Crisis in the Middle East,” *Middle East Review of International Affairs*, Vol. 10, No. 1 (March 2006).

this coincided with state formation; in others, religion gradually replaced other symbols as the pre-eminent national identity.¹¹⁸

In Saudi Arabia, for example, religion has deliberately been used by the regime to build a national Saudi identity, which supposedly consolidates the legitimacy of the ruling family. Saudi Arabia is ruled by a theocracy. Citizenship is not open to non-Muslims. The idea of religious pluralism has neither meaning nor support among many segments of the population and Muslim norms and practices are encouraged, promoted, and even enforced by the state.¹¹⁹ Islam's holy book, the Qur'an, is the constitution, and Islamic law, Shari'ah, is the foundation of the legal system. Even national symbols, such as the flag and anthem, are designed to promote Islamic values.




Figure 5. **National Flag and Coat of Arms of the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia**

The Saudi flag is the traditional Wahhabi banner in color. Its Arabic inscription, which reads, "There is no god but God; Muhammad is the Messenger of God," and sword are all salient religious motifs.¹²⁰ The state coat of arms consists of crossed swords and a date palm tree. The former symbolizes the bond between the house of Sa'ud and Islam; the latter indicates the territorial dimension of the kingdom and its nature.¹²¹

¹¹⁸ P R Kumaraswamy "Who Am I? The Identity Crisis in the Middle East," *Middle East Review of International Affairs*, Vol. 10, No. 1 (March 2006).

¹¹⁹ Joseph Nevo, 'Religion and National Identity in Saudi Arabia' *Middle Eastern Studies*. London: Jul 1998. Vol. 34, Issue. 3; p. 34.

¹²⁰ Ibid.

¹²¹ Lilly Weissbrod, "Religion as National Identity in a Secular Society," *Review of Religious Research*, Vol. 24, No. 3, March, 1983, p. 188-205.

Israel and Saudi Arabia are just two prominent examples of how religion has been influential in the construction of national identities. Other examples, such as the role of Catholicism in defining the Irish identity or the role of the Shi'a faction of Islam in differentiating the Iranian identity are obvious.¹²² Even in an apparently secular country such as England, God has not really ceased to be an Englishman.¹²³ Finally, providing a national identity may not be a universal function of religion in contemporary societies, but it is still a fairly common one.¹²⁴

E. CONCLUSION

Despite the reality of national diversity, many nations, including multiethnic ones, have continuously strived to maintain their national unity by promoting a common national identity. Language, education, national symbols, and religion have been used extensively for this purpose.

Last but not least, in order to have peaceful and successful ethnic accommodation, political systems should be redesigned to ensure that all ethnic groups have a voice in governmental and legislative procedures. In the following chapter, a power-sharing model of consociational democracy is discussed.

¹²² Lilly Weissbrod, "Religion as National Identity in a Secular Society," *Review of Religious Research*, Vol. 24, No. 3, March, 1983, p. 188-205.

¹²³ Joseph Nevo, 'Religion and national identity in Saudi Arabia,' *Middle Eastern Studies*, Vol.34, Iss. 3; p. 34, London, Jul 1998. (In his famous 1970 novel, "God is an Englishman," R.F. Delderfield spoke metaphorically about the extraordinary entrepreneurial progress and industrial transformation of Britain during the Victorian era.)

¹²⁴ Ibid.

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VI. REENGINEERING THE POLITICAL SYSTEM

Elections themselves do not necessarily guarantee democracy and fair representation of ethnic minorities. Every democratic system differs in design. In some electoral designs, minorities are not provided opportunity to participate in the decision-making process. These are called *hegemonic democracies*.¹²⁵ Hegemonic democracies are designed to remove minorities from political systems or to grant unfair advantages to ethnic majorities.

Other strategies that fall into the hegemonic approach include subjugation, isolation, avoidance, and displacement of ethnic groups.¹²⁶ As I argued in previous chapters, the struggle for political power is one of the direct or indirect sources of ethnic conflicts. One important way to resolve ethnic tensions is to reengineer a participatory electoral system. As a result, ethnic groups with a voice in the government are often able to resolve their differences through the political process rather than resort to war.¹²⁷

The central question of political engineering is: *what kind of political system can facilitate ethnic peace in situations where one ethnic identity is dominating the political space?* The answer to that question is not a simple but a definitive one. The common assumption is that choices over the basic rules of the game affect its outcome.¹²⁸ David Horowitz (1985) writes, “Where there is some determination to play by the rules, rules can reconstruct the system so the game itself changes.”

Ethnic identities tend to be invested with a great deal of symbolic and emotional meaning. Aspiring politicians in such “divided societies” often have strong incentives to “play the ethnic card” at election time, using communal demands to mobilize voters.¹²⁹

¹²⁵ Daniel Byman (2002) uses this term.

¹²⁶ Timothy, Sisk, “Power Sharing and International Mediation in Ethnic Conflicts,” 1996, p. 27.

¹²⁷ Ibid.

¹²⁸ Ibid.

¹²⁹ Benjamin Reilly, “Electoral Systems and Conflict Management: Comparing STV and AV Systems,” Journal of Democracy Volume 13, Number 2 April 2002.

Where the people rallied around ethnic identities, simple majoritarian democracy is doomed to fail. Horowitz (1985) describes the conditions under simple majority rule as follows:

Ethnic parties as developed majorities took power and minorities took shelter. It was a fearful situation, in which the prospect of minority exclusion from government underpinned by ethnic voting was potentially permanent...Civil violence, military coups, and the advent of single party regimes can all be traced to the problem of exclusion and inclusion.¹³⁰

Due to the shortcomings and unexpected consequences of simple majority rule in ethnically divided societies, a power-sharing approach has emerged as a possible electoral design. The term power-sharing has been defined by Arend Lipjhart as a set of principles that, when carried out through practices and institutions, provide every significant identity group or segment in a society representation and decision-making abilities on common issues and a degree of autonomy over issues of importance to the group.¹³¹

In this chapter, I argue that arrangements in the political space with regard to representation in the electoral system will affect the potential for ethnic conflict. Furthermore, in multiethnic societies, certain electoral systems can successfully manage ethnic tension through political participation. In this context, while there is widespread agreement on the importance of electoral systems in shaping the wider political arena, there is profound disagreement among political scientists as to which electoral systems are most appropriate for divided societies.¹³² In this study, I argue that consociational democracy is the ideal power-sharing arrangement for multiethnic nations. The most important advantage of consociational democracy over other power-sharing alternatives is that it has been successfully implemented in many countries, including Belgium, the Netherlands, Malaysia (1955–1969), and Lebanon (1943–1975).

¹³⁰ David Horowitz, “Ethnic Groups in Conflict,” 1985, p. 102.

¹³¹ Timothy, Sisk, “Power Sharing and International Mediation in Ethnic Conflicts,” 1996, p. 5.

¹³² Benjamin Reilly, “Electoral Systems and Conflict Management: Comparing STV and AV Systems,” Journal of Democracy Volume 13, Number 2 April 2002.

A. CONSOCIATIONAL DEMOCRACY

Consociational democracy promotes proportional representation to ensure that minorities are heard. Political representation is widely seen as the most common way to ensure that government represents the interests of the minority as well as the majority. In terms of electoral systems, consociationalists argue that party-list proportional representation is the best choice for divided societies, as it enables all significant ethnic groups, including minorities, to “define themselves” into ethnically based parties and to gain representation in the parliament in proportion to their numbers in the community as a whole.¹³³

Consociationalism, above all, relies on elite cooperation as a principal characteristic of conflict management in deeply divided societies.¹³⁴ There are four fundamental requirements for consociational democracies to work. First, elites must have power to accommodate their people. Second, the elites from one group must be willing to work with elites from other groups. Third, elites must be committed to the cause of democracy and willing to work to ensure its survival. Finally, the elites must accept and understand the problems that will arise in the case of fragmentation. (Lijphart 1969).

The mechanics of consociationalism can be distilled into the four basic elements that must be present to make a constitution worthy of the consociational name.¹³⁵ They are: (i) executive power-sharing among representatives of all significant groups (grand coalition); (ii) high degree of internal autonomy for groups that wish to have it (segmental autonomy); (iii) proportional representation and proportional allocation of civil service positions and public funds (proportionality); and (iv) a minority veto on the most vital issues (mutual veto).¹³⁶

¹³³ Arend Lijphart, ‘Electoral Systems, Party Systems and Conflict Management in Segmented Societies’ in R.A. Schreirer (ed), *Critical Choices for South Africa: An Agenda for the 1990s* (Cape Town: Oxford University Press), p. 10-13.

¹³⁴ Timothy, Sisk, “Power Sharing and International Mediation in Ethnic Conflicts,” 1996, p.34.

¹³⁵ Andrew Reynolds “Majoritarian or Power-Sharing Government,” *Constitutional Design 2000*, December 9–11, 1999.

¹³⁶ Arend Lijphart, “Democracy in Plural Societies,” New Haven and London Yale University Press, 1977, p. 25.

The four principles of consociational democracy provide an overarching umbrella for all ethnic parties, unlike the adversarial nature of majority democracies. These principles are briefly discussed below:

1. Grand Coalition

The primary characteristic of consociational democracy is that the political leaders of all significant segments of a plural society cooperate in a grand coalition to govern the country.¹³⁷ The leaders of the ethnic groups recognize the dangers of non-cooperation.

Grand coalitions can occur either in the cabinet or in the parliamentary system, in “grand councils,” or as a grand coalition of a president and senior executive in the presidential system.¹³⁸ In the Austrian case, the grand coalition cabinet that ruled the country from 1945 to 1966 induced a careful balance between two overwhelmingly strong parties representing the Catholic and socialist segments.¹³⁹ But in the case of Belgium and the Netherlands, grand coalitions were formed in permanent or ad hoc councils and committees, that formally had an advisory function but with actuality often had a decisive influence.¹⁴⁰

Another relatively new coalition, which ended four long decades of violence in Northern Ireland and came to life after long-lasting negotiations, is known as the Good Friday Peace Agreement of April 1998. The Ulster Unionist (UUP-Protestant), Progressive Unionist (PUP-Protestant), Social Democratic, and Labor Party (SDLP-Catholic) all came together to form a coalition.

2. Segmental Autonomy

The idea of segmental authority is to delegate rule-making and rule-applying powers to individual ethnic groups. According to Lijphart, there are decisions that require the consensus of all ethnic groups and decisions that concern only a single ethnic group/ a segment of the entire population. On all matters of common interest, decisions should be

¹³⁷ Arend Lijphart, “Democracy in Plural Societies,” New Haven and London Yale University Press, 1977, p. 25.

¹³⁸ Ibid, p. 118.

¹³⁹ Ibid, p. 32.

¹⁴⁰ Ibid.

made by all segments together, with a roughly proportional degree of influence, whereas, on all other matters, the decisions and their execution can be left to the separate segments (Lijphart, 1977). As I touched upon in previous chapters, in the realm of cultural affairs, segmental autonomy in Belgium, Austria, and the Netherlands has become quite extensive.¹⁴¹

3. Proportionality

The principle of proportionality rests at the heart of consociational democracy. Proportionality, as opposed to majority rule, is important for two reasons. First, it is a method of allocating financial and other governmental resources. More importantly, proportionality ensures that, through the electoral system, ethnic group demographics are reflected in parliamentary or executive branch representation.

In Belgium, the reforms of 1970 established a well-designed consociational democracy. The government (council of members) had to have an equal number of Flemish- and French-speaking ministers; the same rule applied to the highest courts, to the important Permanent Language commission, and to the upper ranks of the armed forces.¹⁴² In Belgium, representation at the federal level parallels the demographic characteristics of the population. After recommendations by the Royal Commission on Bilingualism and Biculturalism concerning civil service, representation of French-speaking minorities increased to 24 percent in 1974, though it had been only 13 percent in 1953.¹⁴³

4. Mutual Veto

Participation in a political coalition does not guarantee the protection of ethnic minorities since, even in the “grand coalitions,” decisions are made with the approval of a majority. A mutual or minority veto ensures that at the point at which a vital interest of an ethnic group is at stake, it will not be simply outvoted by the majority. While the minority

¹⁴¹ Arend Lijphart, “Democracy in Plural Societies,” New Haven and London Yale University Press, 1977, p. 43.

¹⁴² Ulrich, Schneckener, “Making Power Sharing Work,” Lessons From Success and Failures in Ethnic Conflict Regulation,” Journal of Peace Research, Vol.39, No.2, 2002, p.203-228.

¹⁴³ <http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Canada#Government>, Accessed 21 October 2006, According to this source, Canada’s two official languages, English and French, are the mother tongues of 59.7% and 23.2% of the population, respectively.

veto gives minorities the right to prevent action by others on the most sensitive issues, such as language, education, or cultural rights, it also serves a more important overriding goal, “the power of protecting itself.”¹⁴⁴

The mutual veto can be based on formalized rules or traditional informal practices.¹⁴⁵ The Netherlands and Switzerland offer examples of the informal application of veto.¹⁴⁶ In Belgium, where the veto was once an informal principle, a law amended the constitution to ensure that laws affecting the cultural and educational interests of language groups can be passed only if majorities of both the Dutch-speaking and the French-speaking parliamentary representatives give their approval.

These four basic elements of consociational democracy guarantee that the formation of the executive and legislative branches will include each ethnic group with respect to its demographic power, unlike the adversarial nature of the simple majority-rule democracy. Furthermore, Lijphart consistently asserts that consociationalism is the only viable option for democracy in divided societies:

For many plural societies of the non-Western world, the realistic choice is not between the British (majoritarian) model of democracy and the consociational model, but between consociational democracy and no democracy at all.¹⁴⁷

The great value of consociational democracy is that it offers a powerful conflict-resolving solution to those divided societies that show no hope of generating any inter-ethnic political accommodation.¹⁴⁸ But on the other hand, consociationalism offers few incentives for ethnic leaders to appeal for support beyond their own ethnic bases.¹⁴⁹ In

¹⁴⁴ Timothy Sisk, “Power Sharing and International Mediation in Ethnic Conflicts,” 1996, p.37.

¹⁴⁵ Arend Lijphart, “Democracy in Plural Societies,” New Haven and London Yale University Press, 1977, p.38

¹⁴⁶ Ibid.

¹⁴⁷ Ibid, p. 238.

¹⁴⁸ Andrew Reynolds, “Majoritarian or Power Sharing Government,” Constitutional Design 2000, December 9-11, 1999.

¹⁴⁹ Ibid.

short, Table 2 summarizes the characteristics, ethos, institutions promoted, and principles of the consociational democracy.¹⁵⁰

	Consociational Democracy
Characteristics	Ethnic leaders form coalitions after elections.
Strengths	Provides ethnic groups with guarantees for the protection of their interests.
Weakness	Highly dependent on the choices of the ethnic leaders. They may pursue either conflict or moderation.
Institutions	Parliamentary government. Proportional representation of seats. Proportional representation of electoral systems.

Table 2. **Consociational Democracy**

B. CONCLUSION

Power-sharing systems, if successfully implemented, will decrease group status concerns, increase incentives for groups to cooperate with each other, and give a voice to all ethnic groups in the country.¹⁵¹ Introducing democracy and maintaining the balance of power between different ethnic groups in a highly combustible environment is not a simple task. However, power-sharing systems offer tested examples of success where multiethnic peace has been sustained in different parts of the world. In fact, any incentive for maintaining peace that does not include the possibility of reengineering the political domain will be neither complete nor successful. Thus, redistribution of political power by power-sharing arrangements is the fourth and last tool of the four-fold framework discussed here.

The four-fold framework is derived by analyzing the implications and ramifications of governmental policies on the outcome of both ongoing and past ethnic conflicts around the world. This framework provides us valuable tools to understand how particular governments reacted in the case of ethnic conflict and how well those choices performed under certain circumstances.

¹⁵⁰ Table is taken from Timothy Sisk, "Power Sharing and International Mediation in Ethnic Conflicts," 1996, p.35 and partially modified.

¹⁵¹ Byman, p. 152.

Now it is time to test our model in an ongoing conflict. Iraq, with its considerable multiethnic and multireligious diversity in this context and time, offers a relevant case on which to apply the four-fold framework and see how well it performs. Thus, in the next chapter, we turn to Iraq as a case study.

VII. TESTING THE FRAMEWORK: PRESENT DAY IRAQ

“How can multiethnic Iraq survive and, additionally, govern, defend, and sustain itself?” This is a timely and legitimate question. Since the invasion of Iraq, both the interim Iraqi government and those elected Iraqi governments that have followed, have adopted policies employed to stabilize and help the desired Iraqi end state, “*a constitutional, representative Iraqi government that respects civil rights and has security forces sufficient to maintain domestic order and keep Iraq from safe haven from terrorists,*” have been unsuccessful.¹⁵² However, as of December 2006, these have been unsuccessful. Moreover, the Sunni insurgency and Shi'a militias have contributed to growing sectarian strife, resulting in increased numbers of Iraqi civilian deaths and displaced individuals.¹⁵³

The framework developed in this study is intended to provide an independent alternative model to achieve ethnic peace in Iraq. Iraq, with its multiethnic and multi-religious nature, is indeed an invaluable test ground for new ideas and innovative policies

A. BACKGROUND

Operation Iraqi Freedom and the following regime change in Iraq stimulated worldwide awareness of long-standing animosities between the country’s Sunni and Shi'a Muslim populations, as well as deep divisions between the Arab majority and the Kurd populations in the northern parts of the country.¹⁵⁴ Ethnic and religious conflict is not new to the region. Understanding religious and ethnic diversity and the complexities associated with it will help us to employ the framework.

¹⁵² Desired end state is taken from GAO-06-1094T, “Stabilizing Iraq, An Assessment of the Security Situation,” released on September 2006. Highlights of GAO-06-1094T, a statement for record to the Subcommittee on National Security, Emerging Threats and International Relations; Committee on Government Reform; House of Representatives.

¹⁵³ Ibid.

¹⁵⁴ http://encarta.msn.com/guide_iraqdivisions/Iraq_Religious_and_Ethnic_Divisions.html, Accessed on October 25, 2006, The Encarta Online Encyclopedia.




Figure 6. **Ethnic and Religious Distribution in Iraq¹⁵⁵**

The religious and ethnic diversity of the country can be easily seen on the map in Figure 6. Religious diversity in particular is the one which is difficult for many outsiders to appreciate. Muslims make up 96 percent of Iraq's population, but they are divided among different sects of Islam. A majority of Iraqis, about 60 to 65 percent of the nation's Muslims, adhere to Shi'a.¹⁵⁶ They live mostly in the southern part of the country and control the most productive agricultural region as well as Basra, an important oil-refining center.

Sunni Muslims in Iraq constitute 35 to 40 percent of the overall Muslim population.¹⁵⁷ They live mostly in the central and western parts of the country. Contrary to the general perception, Baghdad is not a Sunni-dominated city. There are a significant number of Shiites, as well as Kurds and Turkmen, in the capital.

¹⁵⁵ http://encarta.msn.com/guide_iraqdivisions/Iraq_Religious_and_Ethnic_Divisions.html, Accessed on October 25, 2006, The Encarta Online Encyclopedia.

¹⁵⁶ Ibid.

¹⁵⁷ Ibid.

The country is also divided on the basis of ethnicity. Notably, there are three distinct ethnic groups in the country: Arabs, Kurds, and Turkmen. Ethnically, about 75 percent of the population is Arab.¹⁵⁸ The Arabs include virtually all of the Shiite population and most of the Sunni Muslims of central Iraq. Kurds, most of whom practice Sunni Islam and are considered distinct in both ethnicity and language, form the largest ethnic minority, constituting 15 to 20 percent of the Iraqi population.¹⁵⁹ Turkmen, descendants of ancient Turkic tribes, are the third-largest ethnic group in Iraq at over two-million strong. The majority of the Turkmen population is in the crucial city of Kirkuk.¹⁶⁰

Although Iraq is an oil-rich country with substantial resources, this has not brought peace and stability to the people since its inception. Arab nationalist governments, particularly the Ba'ath regime that has dominated Iraq since 1964, tried to subordinate Iraq's Shiite and Kurdish communities and impose an unwanted identity on them—policies that led to repeated conflicts.¹⁶¹

Iraq came into existence after the fall of the Ottoman Empire following World War I. Ever since the British rulers installed the Hashemite Faizal of Hijaz, the leader of the Arab forces who fought against the Ottoman armies, as King of Iraq, ethnicity and sectarianism have been at the heart of every political movement in Iraq.¹⁶² New rulers of Iraq, dominated by the Sunni Arab elite, were always concerned with the multiethnic and multi-religious nature of the newly independent country.¹⁶³ In stark contrast to the Ottoman Empire, the new regime envisioned the compulsory assimilation of the different minorities—in fact, a large majority of the population—into the mainstream of Arabism

¹⁵⁸ http://encarta.msn.com/guide_iraqdivisions/Iraq_Religious_and_Ethnic_Divisions.html, Accessed on October 25, 2006, The Encarta Online Encyclopedia.

¹⁵⁹ Ibid.

¹⁶⁰ <http://www.antiwar.com/deliso/?articleid=4185> Accessed on 15 November 2006, “The Forgotten Turkmen of Iraq” by Christopher Deliso.

¹⁶¹ Byman, p. 62.

¹⁶² Andreas Wimmer, “Democracy and Ethno-Religious Conflict in Iraq” Paper presented to the Center on Democracy, Development and the Rule of Law, Stanford University, May 5, 2003

¹⁶³ Ibid.

and, implicitly, Sunni Islam, which was regarded as the centerpiece of the nation's cultural heritage and its foremost contribution to world history.¹⁶⁴

The rise of Pan-Arabism to the status of a national ideology and the Arabization of the army, government, and administration were contested from the beginning.¹⁶⁵ Being excluded from power on the basis of their ethno-religious background, resistance formed along these lines and also gave rise to an ever more articulated Kurdish nationalism and a politicized Shiism.¹⁶⁶ Shiites have rebelled against the successive central governments since the 1930s. In each and every uprising, they were brutally punished by those governments. Thousands lost their lives. Millions were forced to move. Leaders of Shiite tribes were executed. This method was used by the Ba'ath party in order to intimidate Shiites within the country. Most notably after the 1991 Gulf War, on March 3, an Iraqi tank commander retreating from Kuwait fired a shell through one of the portraits of Saddam Hussein in Basra's main square and triggered a Shiite uprising. The consequences were devastating. Hussein's forces leveled the historical centers of the Shiite towns, bombarded sacred Shiite shrines, and executed thousands on the spot. By some estimates, 100,000 people died in reprisal killings between March and September 1991.¹⁶⁷

Like the Shiites, the Kurds in the north suffered their share of brutality from the regime in Baghdad over the years. They revolted against the central government in 1932, 1940, 1958, and 1975. The last Kurdish uprising against the Ba'athist regime came during the Iran-Iraq War. At the end of the Iran-Iraq war, the punishment inflicted by the Ba'ath Party under the leadership of Saddam Hussein shocked the whole world. The

¹⁶⁴ Andreas Wimmer, "Democracy and Ethno-Religious Conflict in Iraq" Paper presented to the Center on Democracy, Development and the Rule of Law, Stanford University, May 5, 2003

¹⁶⁵ Ibid.

¹⁶⁶ Ibid.

¹⁶⁷ Peter W. Galbraith, "The Ghosts of 1991," Los Angeles Times, Saturday, April 12, 2003; p. 19.

gassing of the Kurdish town of Halabja, in retaliation for residents' sympathy for the Kurdish movement and Iran, became a symbol of the genocidal character of the so-called *Anfal*¹⁶⁸ campaign.

Since the invasion, contrary to many expectations, ethnic and religious division divide has not closed but widened. For the first time in the history of Iraq, without government support, people have been targeting other ethnic and religious groups all over the country. Although an elected government, with the help of the United States and the international community, was formed to govern, sustain, and, most importantly, secure the country, leaders of all ethnic and religious groups have presented their unwillingness to dismantle non-governmental powers like the Mahdi army, the Sunni insurgency, and the Kurdish peshmerga. According to the United Nations,¹⁶⁹ daily reports of inter-communal intimidation and murder discuss the numbers of bodies of Sunni and Shi'a men found to be tortured and summarily executed in Baghdad and its surrounding areas.¹⁷⁰

B. APPLICATION OF FRAMEWORK

The intent of this chapter is to take an objective snapshot of the current situation in Iraq as of December 2006 and apply the four-fold framework developed in this study. Each tool in the framework is discussed separately. Disequilibrium between proposed policy tools and the current situation on the ground are highlighted and recommendations are made accordingly.

1. Population Control

I will never believe in differences between people. I am a Sunni and my wife is a Shi'a. I received threats to divorce her or be killed. We left Dora [a once-mixed neighborhood in Baghdad] now. My wife is staying with her family in Sha'b [a Shi'a neighborhood] and I am staying with my

¹⁶⁸ The Al-Anfal (literally: the spoils of war) campaign took its name from the eighth sura of the Koran, where the warriors are reinforced in their faith, reminded of their duties, and encouraged to be merciless with nonbelievers; Andreas Wimmer, "Democracy and Ethno-Religious Conflict in Iraq" Paper presented to the Center on Democracy, Development and the Rule of Law, Stanford University, May 5, 2003.

¹⁶⁹ The report referred is to "UN assistance Mission for Iraq," Human Rights Report, on May 1-June 30, 2006.

¹⁷⁰ GAO-06-1094T, "Stabilizing Iraq: An Assessment of The Security Situation," released on September 2006.

friends in Mansur [a Sunni neighborhood]. I am trying to find a different house but it's difficult now to find a place that accepts both of us in Baghdad.¹⁷¹

—A young Iraqi artist, Baghdad, June 2006

When the U.S.-led coalition conquered the Iraqi regime in May 2003¹⁷², all mechanisms of government and the state collapsed with it. The vast majority of the military, as well as police, ministries, and other authorities disappeared virtually overnight. Civil servants did not turn up for work anymore and their offices were systemically looted and even burned down.¹⁷³

Since June 2003, overall security conditions have deteriorated and grown more complex, as evidenced by an increased number of attacks and more recent Sunni/Shi'a sectarian strife after the 2006 bombing of the Golden Mosque in Samara.¹⁷⁴ As a result of the vacuum created due to the lack of a security structure, the development of political and security institutions have been lagging behind. At this point in time in Iraq, people from all ethnic and religious groups have become more and more suspicious of the central government's ability to control their neighborhoods and provide security. More people, even elected officials within the central government, have been expressing support for the Mahdi army, the Badr organization, various Sunni resistance groups, and the Kurdish peshmerga.

Taken altogether, it is clear that the road to a governable Iraq is through, first and foremost, securing its people. Hence, through the application of “population control” policies, there are two recommendations to be made for successful management of these security problems:

¹⁷¹ Ashraf al-Khalidi; Victor Tanner, “Sectarian Violence: Radical Groups Drive Internal Displacement in Iraq”

¹⁷² I refer to President Bush’s speech of May 1, 2003. He stated, “...Major combat operations in Iraq have ended. In the battle of Iraq, the United States and our allies have prevailed...”

¹⁷³ Jochen Hippler, “Nation Building by Occupation? The Case of Iraq,” Accessed on 12 September 2006. Available at http://www.jochen-hippler.de/Aufsatze/Nation-Building_in_Iraq/nation-building_in_iraq.html, Jochen Hippler Official Website.

¹⁷⁴ GAO-06-1094T, “Stabilizing Iraq, An Assessment Of The Security Situation,” released in September 2006.

a. Building National Security Forces

The government of Iraq should build up its security forces—both national army and police—on the basis of ethnic and religious inclusiveness, with members of Iraq’s various communities distributed across the hierarchies of those forces, as well as within governorates.¹⁷⁵ However, recruiting, training, and organizing Iraq’s security forces in the middle of an ongoing crisis is akin to rebuilding a truck while driving it. It is not such an easy task.

There are serious challenges to forming and deploying security forces that need to be addressed. First, in the face of the enemy, it is always harder to appeal to people to participate in security structures. Iraqi leaders at every level must be encouraged to step forward and take the lead. Those who do so must also be rewarded. Although the presence of coalition forces mitigates any immediate external threats, Iraqis are the ones who are going to secure their country and maintain internal peace. Every single day, the Iraqi government should make significant efforts to enable its national security forces to shoulder more of the load for their own security.

Second, the composition of Iraq’s security forces is also extremely important to stabilizing the security situation in Iraq. Ideally, Kurds, Sunnis, Shiites, and Turkmen should be proportionally represented within the police and security forces. So far, Sunni participation in the Iraq Security Forces (ISF) has not risen to the desired number. After the January 30, 2005, transitional parliamentary elections, some Sunni clerics issued fatwas (religious edicts) calling on Sunni males to enlist in the ISF. There was even a major U.S. effort to recruit Sunnis following the election. Only several thousand Sunnis answered the call.¹⁷⁶ Moreover, in a series of town hall meetings across several Sunni provinces, Sunnis have expressed their desire that, rather than working with existing ISF units, they be allowed to raise their own tribal militias.¹⁷⁷

¹⁷⁵ International Crisis Group. “The Next Iraqi War,” Sectarianism and Civil Conflict,” Middle East Report No. 52, 27 February 2006.

¹⁷⁶ Jeremy M. Sharp, “Iraq’s New Security Forces: The Challenge of Sectarian and Ethnic Influences,” CRS Report for Congress, January 12, 2006.

¹⁷⁷ Ibid.

Moreover, the few Sunnis who participate in the ISF are viewed as collaborators with the occupation forces. They and their families are becoming victims of their fellow Sunnis. In 2005, the ISF police force in Ramadi dissolved after Iraqi officers failed to show up for work after a number of insurgent attacks against them. Sunni police forces also collapsed in Mosul and Fallujah during clashes with insurgents in November 2004.¹⁷⁸

Third, the question of where and how this newly formed security structure will operate is another point of concern. Will the ISF operate in Kurdish-controlled northern Iraq? Will a Shiite-dominated security force be professional enough to handle a volatile security situation in the Sunni-dominated province of Ramadi?

These questions demonstrate serious challenges for the way ahead. Without ensuring that every single individual wearing the ISF uniform will serve for greater good well being of the entire nation rather than serving only their own ethnic/religious constituencies, efforts to secure Iraq will be futile. There are early signs of this movement on the ground. During the recent parliamentary elections of December 2005, some Shiite soldiers wore posters bearing the image of Shiite cleric Muqtada al-Sadr on their chests or fastened them to the ends of raised AK-47 assault rifles.¹⁷⁹ In the past, other units have displayed images of Grand Ayatollah Ali al-Sistani on the backs of their pickup trucks while serving in Baghdad.¹⁸⁰

b. Disband Militias and Peshmerga

Every single day almost a hundred Iraqis become victims of violence at the hands of the sectarian militias. Unfortunately, there are serious concerns that at least some of the militias, are tied to political parties within the current government. Under the shadow of these armed groups and other governmental security forces, security can never be established in Iraq. Recently the U.S. Ambassador to Iraq plainly expressed his concern and hopes for the future in Iraq:

¹⁷⁸ Jeremy M. Sharp, "Iraq's New Security Forces: The Challenge of Sectarian and Ethnic Influences," CRS Report for Congress, January 12, 2006.

¹⁷⁹ Ibid.

¹⁸⁰ Ibid.

As this institutional foundation is strengthened, the Iraqi government will be in a position to reestablish the state's monopoly on force. The need to demobilize unauthorized armed groups, including militias, is a critical part of it.

Despite repeated U.S. requests for them to disband, Iraq's various ethnic and sectarian militias continue to exist and, in some cases, are on the path to being recognized as part of Iraq's security apparatus.¹⁸¹ For example, on June 8, 2006, Iraqi President Jalal Talabani praised an Iran-trained Shiite militia known as the Badr organization and the Kurdish peshmerga security forces.¹⁸²

One of the militia forces operating in Iraq is the peshmerga in northern Iraq. According to some estimates, there are more than 100,000 Kurdish peshmerga in the region. Despite increasing pressure from the central government of Iraq and the United States, Kurdish leaders in the north have refused to disband their forces. According to Massoud Barzani, leader of the Kurdish Democratic Party, one of the two main Kurdish parties, "*We want to keep our peshmerga because they are a symbol of resistance...it's not a matter to be discussed or negotiated.*"¹⁸³ In addition to that, they have requested that the ISF operate in northern Iraq only with the consent of the Kurdistan Regional Government.

The Shiites have two distinct militia organizations in Iraq. In Shiite-dominated southern Iraq, the Badr organization, controlled by the Supreme Council for Islamic Revolution in Iraq (SCIRI), is believed to be responsible for most of the sectarian violence in the country.¹⁸⁴ When U.S. forces discovered a series of covert prisons allegedly run by Shiite members of ISF, investigators uncovered evidence that the

¹⁸¹ Lionel Beehner, "Iraq: Militia Groups," Council of Foreign Relations, 9 June 2005.

¹⁸² Ibid.

¹⁸³ "Kurds Vow to Retain Militia as Guardians of Autonomy," New York Times, Feb. 27, 2005.

¹⁸⁴ Jeremy M. Sharp, "Iraq's New Security Forces: The Challenge of Sectarian and Ethnic Influences," CRS Report for Congress, January 12, 2006.

prisoners were mostly Sunni Arabs and had been tortured at clandestine facilities.¹⁸⁵ The Badr organization is the largest political party in Iraq and is unofficially policing most of southern Iraq.

In contrast to the Badr organization, the Mahdi army refused to take part directly in the government. The Mahdi army, controlled by Muqtada al-Sadr with tacit U.S. and coalition approval, controls Sadr City, a Baghdad slum of some 2.5 million Shiites. The Mahdi army has reportedly formed police units called “punishment committees,” which harass civilians suspected of flouting Islamic law or their authority.¹⁸⁶ According to one U.S. military officer, “the Mahdi army’s got the Iraqi police and Badr’s got the commandos...Everybody’s got their own death squads.”¹⁸⁷

Finally, it is clear that as long as Iraqi government cannot establish a monopoly over the armed forces operating within the country, security and stability will not flourish in Iraq. Some experts question any possible allegiance to a national government because recruits are exclusively drawn from sectarian or ethnic communities, whether Shiite, Sunni, or Kurd.¹⁸⁸ With the existence of armed militia groups, there is only one unfortunate end for Iraq: civil war.

2. Winning Hearts and Minds

Keep back 50m or deadly force will be applied.

—Bilingual notices affixed to the rear bumpers of U.S. military vehicles in Iraq.¹⁸⁹

Immediately after Saddam Hussein’s regime was toppled in May 2003, a number of Sunnis, Kurds, and Shiites started to search for loved ones who had been killed by the brutal regime and buried in mass graves. The Shiites and Kurds were not the only the victims, as some Sunnis were slaughtered by their fellow Sunnis.

¹⁸⁵ Jeremy M. Sharp, “Iraq’s New Security Forces: The Challenge of Sectarian and Ethnic Influences,” CRS Report for Congress, January 12, 2006.

¹⁸⁶ Ibid.

¹⁸⁷ “Killings Linked To Shiite Squads In Iraqi Police Force,” Los Angeles Times, November 29, 2005.

¹⁸⁸ Ibid.

¹⁸⁹ “American Army Tactics in Iraq,” The Economist print edition, December 29th 2004

For over 20 years the Ba'ath regime systematically executed, tortured, raped, terrorized, and repressed all ethnic and religious groups in Iraq. Thus, any governmental policy towards establishing ethnic and religious peace in Iraq must address the *hearts and minds* of the Iraqi people. Although reconciliation after suffering and losing loved ones has never been easy, Iraqis have to shake hands with whoever wants to build a free and democratic country in the region.

It is self-evident that Iraq needs a thorough reconciliation project. Therefore, it is safe to argue that the second tool of the four-fold framework, “winning hearts and minds” holds true for Iraq. Now I will discuss some possible psychological and structural initiatives for Iraq.

a. Psychological Initiatives

None of the censuses performed in Iraq were conducted with neutral international observers. Therefore, census results cannot be verified despite the fact that the information derived from these censuses is essential for ensuring a fair distribution of services and governmental representation.

Since the formation of the new unity government in Iraq, for the first time in the history of the country, political power and economic resources are about to be shared according to demographic figures. However, there are conflicting reports about the demographics of Iraq. Other than Kurds and Arabs, there are other distinct ethnic groups, such as Turkmen, Armenians, and Assyrians. Even today, Iraq's two largest ethnic groups do not agree on their demographic figures. Hence, as soon as the security situation improves, a neutral census under the scrutiny of the international community must be held so that demographic facts may be firmly established.

On the other hand, on October 15, 2005, Iraqis had their first chance since the overthrow of Saddam Hussein to decide for themselves the basics of their government by casting their votes on a constitution. The new constitution recognizes the ethnic facts on the ground. Article 3 of the new constitution states:

Iraq is a country of many nationalities, religions, and sects, and is a part of the Islamic world, is a founding and active member of the Arab League, and is committed to its covenant.

In that regard, the new Iraqi constitution offers more freedoms to its citizens than any other Arab country in the region. However, these policies should not be relegated to paper and forgotten. They should be implemented fairly to all ethnic groups in the country.

In addition to that, justice and truth are fundamental principles in establishing a culture of reconciliation within Iraq. The Iraqi government should emplace a fair system and a rule of law above all ethnic and religious groups. The new constitution addresses these long-awaited desires of the Iraqi people.

Article 19 states:

Every person has the right to be treated with justice in judicial and administrative proceedings...

Moreover, in order to alleviate the suffering of millions of Iraqis, former regime leaders who committed crimes against humanity must be brought to justice. To that end, a new national reconciliation plan announced by Iraqi Prime Minister Nouari al-Malaki holds the former regime's top officials accountable.¹⁹⁰ Although it is too late to bring back the fathers, sons, and the many innocents killed by the Ba'ath regime, bringing to justice those who committed the crimes will help Iraqis to comprehend the shift Iraq is taking.

Justice and truth must also hold for the post-Saddam environment. Recently, U.S. forces and the ISF have discovered secret prisons where mostly Sunni men were held and tortured. It should be made clear that no criminal will be protected by the government. These incidents came to light when some Sunnis voiced their concerns about Shi'a militia infiltration of the ISF. In the meantime, the fact that the Interior Ministry, which oversees the ISF, is controlled by a Shiite politician is adding fuel to the fire. Regarding this argument, Sarah Leah Wilson, director of Human Rights Watch's Middle East division has said:

¹⁹⁰ <http://www.heritage.org/Research/MiddleEast/wm1139.cfm>, "What Is Needed for Reconciliation in Iraq" James A. Phillips, Accessed November 6, 2006, The Heritage Foundation.

Evidence suggests that Iraqi security forces are involved in these horrific crimes, and thus far the government has not held them accountable. The Iraqi government must stop giving protection to security forces responsible for abduction, torture, and murder.

These are serious allegations that require serious attention. Otherwise, there will not be any difference between Saddam's regime and the new ones except for a change in who is oppressed. Therefore, those who have committed crimes must be held accountable.

Last but not least, national, tribal, and religious leaders must promote unity and peace. However, in the summer of 2006, Kurdish regional leader Massoud Barzani provoked controversy by refusing to fly the Iraqi flag above official buildings, arguing that Kurds view the flag as a symbol of the former regime.¹⁹¹ Yet, Sunnis and Shiites in Iraq, view this as a betrayal of Arab unity and the sacrifices made during the Iran-Iraq war.¹⁹²

In contrast to the Kurdish leadership, who distance themselves from Iraq at every opportunity, the Grand Ayatollah Ali Sistani, the most revered Shiite leader in Iraq, has consistently been issuing fatwas that denounce violence and sectarian conflict while promoting moderation in Iraq. In his advice to Muslims living in non-Muslim lands, he emphasizes respect for other religious and cultural traditions, along with a strong emphasis on maintaining Muslim values. The new national unity government should encourage voices of reconciliation and moderation to announce fatwas to gain and maintain population support for the government.

b. Structural Initiatives

Sunni dominance of the regime over several decades also caused disequilibrium in access to governmental services. The new unity government needs to address the redistribution of public services and cultural/language rights while also rehabilitating decades of mismanagement.

¹⁹¹ Larry Korb and Brian Katulis "Progress in Iraq: 2006 Report Card on the Bush Administration's Iraq Policy," Center for American Progress Action Fund, October 24, 2006.

¹⁹² Ibid.

The new Iraqi constitution promises a fresh start towards reconciling the expectations of the different groups. After many weeks of squabbling and protracted negotiations between Kurds, Sunnis, and Shiites, the historic document was declared the law of the land on October 15, 2005, in what Talabani, the President of Iraq, characterized as “a vital step toward restoring law and order in this war-torn nation.”

According to Article 4 of the new constitution:

The Arabic language and Kurdish language are the two official languages of Iraq. The right of Iraqis to educate their children in their mother tongue, such as Turkmen, Syriac and Armenian, in government educational institutions in accordance with educational guidelines, or in any other language in private educational institutions, is guaranteed.¹⁹³

Furthermore, the constitution also acknowledges that the Turkmen and Syriac language are also official languages in areas where their speakers constitute a certain percentage of the population. Each region or governorate may adopt any other local language as an additional official language if the majority of its population so decides in a general referendum.

However, there is a lot of work yet to be done toward the economic reconstruction of the country. Wars, internal conflicts, and international embargoes have had dramatic effects, causing hardships for the entire population. No single group is significantly better off than the others. The overall conditions, in terms of the availability of electricity and water, are worrisome. Even early on a June morning, the temperature can reach 130°F in the southern Shiite town of Samawah.¹⁹⁴ Electricity and water shortages are not only deteriorating security conditions but, more importantly, eroding confidence in the national unity government.

Understandably, there are high expectations among Iraqis after the fall of Saddam Hussein’s regime. Lieutenant General David Petraeus calls it the “man on the moon” syndrome: “*If America can put a man on the moon, it certainly can get me 24/7*

¹⁹³ Iraqi Constitution, Article 4.

¹⁹⁴ <http://www.villagevoice.com/news/0534.axe.67092.6.html> , Accessed on 22 November 2006, “Power, Water, planning—and the lack thereof—in Southern Iraq,” David Axe, 23 August, 2005

*electricity.*¹⁹⁵ In fact, the availability of electricity in the capital remains below the prewar levels, at 8.1 hours per day.¹⁹⁶ This fuels tension among ordinary Iraqis because, before the invasion, Iraqi dictator Saddam Hussein often used electricity distribution to reward friends and punish enemies. Hence, the national unity government should precipitate efforts to provide the basic needs of modern life to every corner of the country as soon as possible. The longer the country stays in the dark, the harder it will become to win the hearts and minds of the Iraqi people.

Last but not least, one of the significant decisions the national unity government has to make concerns oil revenues. Iraq's key source of revenue is oil. This commodity accounts for 90 percent or more of the country's exports.¹⁹⁷ Continuous demands by the Kurdish minority to include the oil-rich city of Kirkuk under their control is only one indication of the sensitivity of the issue.¹⁹⁸ While oil resources and revenues can complicate Iraq's political transition, they can also assist the country's long-term stability and unity by giving all Iraqis a stake in the country's future and supporting the development of a middle class that transcends ethnic divisions.¹⁹⁹

The new Iraqi constitution has addressed these concerns. Article 110 of the constitution states:

“Oil and gas are the ownership of all the people of Iraq in all the regions and governorates.”

Finally, the national unity government should not let oil revenues be allocated along ethnic lines. The management and distribution of oil revenues have been daunting tasks in many oil-rich countries but Iraq faces additional challenges.

¹⁹⁵ Lieutenant General David H. Petraeus, U.S. Army Learning Counterinsurgency: Observations from Soldiering in Iraq” Military Review January-February 2006

¹⁹⁶ <http://www.brookings.edu/iraqindex>, Accessed on November 8, 2006, The Brookings Institution.

¹⁹⁷ Energy Information Administration, U.S. Department of Energy, “Country Analysis Briefs: Iraq,” <http://www.eia.doe.gov/emeu/cabs/> Accessed November 13, 2006.

¹⁹⁸ Daniel Serwer and Ylber Bajraktari, “Managing Iraq's Oil Revenues,” U.S. Institute of Peace Briefing February 20, 2004.

¹⁹⁹ Ibid.

Governmental policies regarding oil revenues need to be tailored by appreciating the fact that there would be no difference between dividing oil revenues and dividing Iraq.

3. Strengthening National Identity

Despite having a long history as a civilization, the feasibility of an overarching national identity as Iraq is widely questioned by many scholars. In 1933, Iraq's first ruler, King Faisal I, lamented: "There is still no Iraqi people but unimaginable masses of human beings, devoid of any patriotic idea, imbued with many religious traditions, and absurdities connected by no common tie, giving ear to evil, prone to anarchy, and perpetually ready to rise against any government whatever."²⁰⁰

If a sense of Iraqi national identity does exist, this does not override communal forms of identity along ethnic, geographic, tribal or religious boundaries.²⁰¹ The importance of ethnic and religious affiliation in defining identity is becoming more and more visible everyday. If one reads or watches news about Iraq at any give time, one will see how often religious or ethnic affiliations are attached to elected Iraqi leaders, such as the Shi'a prime minister of Iraq or the Kurdish president of Iraq.

All the former constitutions have specified the Arabization of Iraq as the domineering characteristic, and this has characterized its identity from a historical perspective. Decades of brutality under Saddam Hussein's regime have eroded, but not destroyed, the sense of Iraqi identity formed only in the 20th century. Ethnic identity now plays a much stronger role in Iraq than it once did, mainly because of the regime's favoritism towards the Sunni minority and its repression of Kurdish and Shi'a rebellions²⁰²

Like most social phenomena, national identity is not immune from evolution due to changing demographics. It is suggested that all national identities are subject to debate and disagreement but, in a more profound way, those identities are especially in play

²⁰⁰ Daniel Byman, "Constructing a Democratic Iraq: Challenges and Opportunities," *International Security* 28.1 (2003) 47-78.

²⁰¹ James Dobbins, John G. McGinn, "America's Role in Nation-Building: From Germany to Iraq," RAND, 2005.

²⁰² Daniel Serwer; Ylber Bajraktari, "Iraq's Middle Class Is the Key to Unity," USI_Peace_Briefing, December 23, 2003

when states are undergoing traumatic reorganization.²⁰³ The national unity government of Iraq, in its reconciliation efforts, needs to create an overarching and inclusive national identity, where people can still be Turkmen, Kurd, Shiite, or Sunni but, at the same time, a proud Iraqis.

In Iraq, it seems not neither language nor religion could be part of an identity-hardening effort. The sectarian divide between the Sunni and Shiite is, at least for now, difficult to manage. Although in the very first article of the constitution, Islam is defined as the official religion of the state and its foundation of source of legislation, the sectarian divide between Sunni and Shiite hardly makes Islam a factor of national cohesion. Instead, reforming an outdated and propaganda-filled educational system that aimed to train foot soldiers rather than citizens, and promulgating the new constitution and the values embedded in it could be likely points of unification for all Iraqis.

First, renewing Iraq's educational system is vital because Iraqi youth will determine their country's future. Currently, there are madrasas in the south that mostly teach Islamic theology, a quasi-independent educational system in the north, and a small number of secular institutions throughout the country. All of them have different characteristics and curricula. Decisions to reform a curriculum must be strictly focused on Iraqi identity and in line with Iraqi values and culture. This would enlighten a religious upbringing, and instill the establishment of and appreciation for the values of democracy, free speech, human rights, social cohesion, equality, and tolerance.

Part of the curriculum reform and development will require a review of textbooks. Since 1973, when Saddam Hussein ordered all school history to be rewritten from the Ba'ath Party perspective, children have been taught that Iraq was triumphant in all wars and that Saddam Hussein single-handedly defended the Arab world against greedy Zionism.²⁰⁴ Now, it is time to rewrite the textbooks to promote understanding among all ethnic and religious groups in Iraq and to free them from hostile references to others.

Second, the new Iraqi constitution, which was ratified by a wide margin on October 15, 2005, opened a new chapter for all Iraqis. As a whole, it brings a definition

²⁰³ Jeremy M. Sharp, "Iraq's New Security Forces: The Challenge of Sectarian and Ethnic Influences," CRS Report for Congress, January 12, 2006

²⁰⁴ Christina Asquith, "A New History of Iraq," The Guardian, November 25, 2003.

to Iraqi national identity. Article 3 of the new constitution states that: “*Iraq is a country of multiple nationalities and religious sects. It is a founding and acting member in the Arab League and is committed to its charter and its part of Islamic world.*”

Furthermore, the new constitution calls for unprecedented basic human rights and public freedoms for all Iraqis. All Iraqis are equal before the law regardless of gender, race, color, opinion, religion, sect, or belief and discrimination based on these differences is prohibited. So, the question of what makes an Iraqi an Iraqi has been defined in a totally different way than it was before. Since the ratification of the new constitution, the Iraqi people are bound together by promising future of its constitution. The national unity government should place the promulgation of the new constitution and the values embedded within it at the center of restructuring a new Iraqi identity. It should do so because, from now on, unlike any neighbors except Turkey, the people of Iraq have the right to cast votes, and to protest, and the power to make changes if not satisfied.

Another unorthodox way to strengthen Iraqi national identity is to promote the ancient and glorious past of Mesopotamia. Although modern Iraq was created after WW I, it occupies the territory that historians traditionally consider to be the birthplace of the earliest civilizations. This rich past might provide all Iraqis a shared heritage and identity. To expand upon the glorious kingdoms of Sumer, Akkad, Babylon, and Assyria—all of which are deeply revered and embraced—can provide a foundation of nationhood for the people of Iraq. The national unity government could use symbols of ancient Iraq to promote an overarching identity. Simultaneously, archeological studies and national museums should be used to consolidate these efforts

4. Reengineering the Political System

All Iraqis must have a voice in the new government and all citizens must have their rights protected.

—George W. Bush, February 27, 2003

The last tool of the four-fold model proposes a power-sharing model for Iraq. Given the fact that Iraq had a horrible experience under centralized government, a more inclusive form of government is a necessary condition for successful reconciliation. A majority-rule system is completely out of the question because it risks alienating large

minorities, such as the Sunnis and Turkmen, from the political process, as was seen after the second general election, which was boycotted by many disaffected Sunnis.²⁰⁵

For Iraq, I recommend Lijphart's consociational democracy for two reasons. First, on December 15, 2005, Iraqis voted largely along sectarian and ethnic lines in the National Assembly election. The United Iraqi Alliance, mostly Shiite, received 41.2 percent of the vote, which translated into 128 seats in the parliament. The Democratic Patriotic Alliance of Kurdistan received 21.7 of the votes and consequently gained 53 seats in the assembly. The Iraqi Accord Front, mainly Sunni Arab, obtained 15.1 percent of the vote and thus won 44 seats in the parliament. The remaining 50 seats in the parliament were divided among nine other parties, which together received 22 percent of the vote. Second, the representation of all ethnic groups through the mechanisms of grand coalition, group autonomy as well as proportionality, and mutual veto is likely to be best for Iraq in terms of political and civil rights.

Furthermore, when taking a thorough look into the new Iraqi constitution and how parliamentary seats were assigned in the December 15, 2005, election, one can see the implementation of mechanisms of consociational democracy.

Under the newly adopted constitution of Iraq, the Presidency Council of Iraq, the Prime Minister of Iraq, and the Cabinet must have the support of two-thirds, or 184 members, of the Iraqi National Assembly. However, no ethnic or sectarian party in the parliament has enough seats to form a government on its own. Thus, the formation of a government requires a grand coalition across major political parties.

The national unity government took office May 20, 2006, with parliamentary seats as shown in Table 3.²⁰⁶

²⁰⁵ Andrew Cooper, "Where Civil Blood Makes Civil Hands Unclean," Sydney Globalist, May 2006

²⁰⁶ http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Government_of_Iraq_from_, 2006, Accessed on 13 November 2006, The Wikipedia Online Library.

	Political Parties	Seats
1	<u>United Iraqi Alliance</u>	113
2	<u>Kurdistani Alliance</u>	53
3	<u>Iraqi Accord Front</u>	44
4	<u>Iraqi National List</u>	25
5	<u>The Upholders of the Messa</u>	2
6	<u>Iraqi Turkmen Fr</u>	1
7	<u>National Rafidain List</u>	1
TOTAL		240

Table 3. **Political Parties of the Grand Coalition in Iraqi Government**

Table 3 clearly shows that the political leaders of almost all significant ethnic and religious groups came together to govern Iraq, recognizing the dangers of non-cooperation.

Segmental autonomy is the second mechanism of consociational democracy. Decentralization of government is hardly a radical idea for Iraq. The Iraqi constitution already provides for a procedure for provinces to combine into regional governments. Chapter V, *Authorities of the Regions*, of the new Iraqi constitution, which was approved by a referendum that took place on October 15, 2005, describes the form of Iraq's federation. It begins by stating that the republic's federal system is made up of the capital, regions, decentralized provinces, and local administrations.

By dividing power between two levels of government, the constitution gives groups greater control over their own political, social, and economic affairs while making them feel less exploited as well as more secure. However, segmental autonomy should not be understood as a step towards partition. It is a means of building a single, unified, and democratic Iraq where all ethnic and religious groups coexist peacefully within a single entity.

Another mechanism of consociational democracy is proportional representation, which rests at the heart of the whole power-sharing idea. The implementation of proportional representation is highly visible in the design of the legislative election system and later in the formation of the Iraqi government.

Acting under United Nations advice, Iraq adopted a purely proportional representation system, within which a party's share of seats in the National Assembly is

determined by its share of the national vote total.²⁰⁷ Under the system of proportional representation adopted in Iraq, a successful party need approximately 1/275 of the national vote to obtain a representative in the National Assembly.²⁰⁸ In addition to that, in the formation of the national unity government of Iraq, key governmental offices were allocated according to ethnic and religious concerns. For example, the Presidency Council has three members to accommodate Iraq's three largest groups: Sunni Muslim Arabs, Shiite Muslim Arabs, and Kurds. Whereas Jalal Talabani, a Kurd, was reelected as President of Iraq, a Sunni, Tariq Al-Hashimi, and a Shiite, Adil Abdul Mahdi, were elected as the two Vice Presidents of Iraq.

The same delicate balance can be seen in the National Assembly speaker elections. The assembly elected a prominent Sunni leader, Mahmoud al-Mashhadani, as the Speaker. Khaled al-Attiyah, a Shiite from the United Iraqi Alliance, and Aref Tayfur, a Kurd from the Kurdish Alliance, were elected as Deputy Speakers.

However, in contrast to the United States, the main executive office in the Iraqi government is the Prime Minister. On May 20, 2006, the Iraqi National Assembly approved a cabinet proposed by the Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki, a Shiite from the United Iraqi Alliance. He has two Deputy Prime Ministers: Bahram Salih, a Kurd from the Kurdish Alliance and Salam al-Zaubai, a Sunni from the Iraqi Accord Front.

Essentially, the main government offices—the presidency, speaker of the parliament, and prime minister—are headed by men from the three different ethnic/religious groups in Iraq. It seems that during the formation of the new national unity government, pains have been taken to try and fairly distribute the main legislative and executive powers among the different constituencies after ratification of the new constitution.

At this point, why Turkmen over two million population strength were underrepresented in formation of unity government is an interesting question to raise. Prior to the December 15, 2006, elections, Turkish televisions showed thousands of Kurds from northern cities of Iraq being brought into Kirkuk. This maneuver was entirely

²⁰⁷ Nathan J. Brown, "Post-Election Iraq Facing the Constitutional Challenge," Democracy and Rule of Law Project, February 2005.

²⁰⁸ Ibid.

organized and financially supported by the two major Kurdish parties (KDP) Kurdistan Democratic Party and (PUK) Patriotic Union of Kurdistan.²⁰⁹ Moreover, there are serious allegations on conduct of elections in Kirkuk. According to some reports electoral commission of Iraq (IECI) had allowed additional 227.000 Kurds, who illegally entered the city to register and vote in the elections. After completing the registration processes by the Independent Electoral Commission of Iraq (IECI), it was noted that since the last election of January 30th 2005, there was an average 8.19 percent increase in the number of voters in Iraq's eighteen provinces; however, only in Kirkuk the voter numbers was increased to 45 percent.²¹⁰ The unusual increase was due to the illegal settlements of the Kurds encouraged by the KPD and PUK parties to change the demographic components of Kirkuk.²¹¹ The KDP and PUK intention is to increase the Kurdish population in Kirkuk as a preparation method for the referendum which will determine the future of the city on January 30, 2007.²¹² I strongly argue that these Kurdish policies towards changing demographics of city of Kirkuk will not bring hope and peace for any of ethnic groups in the country. Leaders of ethnic groups should not play with demographic figures for the sake of gaining more political representation and economic advantages.

Last but not least: there is the mutual veto. The new Iraqi constitution ensures that no constitutional amendment can be made without the consent of the majority. Furthermore, a simple majority is not enough to amend an article to the constitution. Also, it cannot be rejected by two-thirds of the voters in three or more governorates.²¹³ Due to the fact that Iraq is divided into 18 governorates, any constitutional amendment without sizable minority consent seems unlikely to come to pass in Iraq. Hence, the minority veto gives Iraqis the right to prevent action by other dominant ethnic or religious groups on the most sensitive issues, like language education and cultural rights.

²⁰⁹ <http://www.kirkuk.net/eng/index.asp?id=1740&katagori=1&s=detay>, Accessed on 11 December 2006. Iraqi Turkmen Front.

²¹⁰ Ibid.

²¹¹ Ibid.

²¹² Ibid.

²¹³ Iraqi Constitution, Article 142.

C. CONCLUSION

The future of Iraq is not yet known. Many ideas as to how to secure a peaceful, democratic Iraq in the heart of the Middle East are being floated. The framework developed here provides an independent alternative for how to sustain ethnic peace in Iraq in the years to come. Although there are discrepancies as to which policies should be implemented, most people agree that there are critical challenges ahead for the national unity government.

The security dilemma is the biggest of the challenges confronting Iraq. However, the national unity government and the U.S-led coalition have taken a number of steps towards sustaining peace and security in the country. Certainly, Iraq will become a stable and prosperous nation only if security is established all over the country. The government's inability to stabilize the security situation has led armed militia groups to act like legitimate sources of authority in some parts of the country. Armed groups and death squads from all ethnic and religious background have proliferated. More dangerously, the security dilemma is being played out on the streets of Baghdad, where tit for tat sectarian violence has torn the city apart.

In the meantime, one might argue that violence still reigns over the daily life of millions of Iraqis. The government has recognized the problem and has taken and continues to take measures to stop the violence. As the U.S. ambassador to Iraq asserted, the Iraqi government must reestablish a monopoly on force and demobilize unauthorized armed groups in the near future. Hopefully, security problems can be expected to decline as Iraq moves toward accommodating the unhappy ethnic groups by means of reconciliation and political participation.

Long after I proposed the “hearts and minds” model for reconciling the differences among ethnic and religious groups, the Prime Minister of Iraq, Nouri al-Maliki, announced the 24-point National Reconciliation Project before the parliament. A country torn by multiple wars and conflicts over three decades needs nothing less than reconciliation through an effective hearts-and-minds campaign. However, the structural initiatives of this campaign are important as well. The national unity government should expend a great deal more effort to make the country more livable than it was in pre-invasion times. The national unity government should deliver basic humanitarian

services, such as food and medical supplies, without regard to ethnic and religious considerations. Without this, the Iraqi people will not discern a difference between pre-invasion and post-invasion Iraq until the next parliamentary elections, which has been the hallmark of post-Saddam Iraq.

The third tool of the four-fold model, which proposes strengthening the national identity, seems like the weakest point of the framework in the case of Iraq. The lack of an overarching national identity and the nature of language and religion in Iraqi politics make it harder to find a common ground for identity-hardening efforts. However, new educational policies supported by a national curriculum and the promulgation of the new constitution and the values and freedoms embedded in it are considered to be tools for rebuilding an overarching Iraqi identity. As in the case of Malaysia, the Iraqi people could build the democratic and free country that they have all suffered to establish and proudly bequeath it to the next generation of Iraqis.

Consociational democracy, meanwhile, has already been rooted in Iraq. Iraqi leaders, under the advice of the United Nations and the international community, restructured the Iraqi political system to enable the participation of all ethnic and religious groups. Both the national parliamentary elections and the formation of the national unity government of Iraq incorporated the four characteristic mechanisms of consociational democracy. Acknowledging all the obstacles and stakes in Iraq, I argue that consociational democracy is the only viable option to ensure a democratic unitary Iraq.

At this point in time and history, the Iraqi people and their elected leaders have arrived at an important crossroads and a critical juncture. They will either coexist together or they will continue to suffer the consequences of not doing so. As Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki has acknowledged, many of the challenges ahead are politically driven. The new Iraqi government's ability to address these challenges will define Iraq's future in the first decade of the twenty-first century.

VIII. CONCLUSION

Can governments prevent ethnic conflict through policy development and enforcement? Throughout this thesis I have tried to develop to provide tools to prevent ethnic conflict. According to Ernest Regehr, almost two-thirds of all political conflicts worldwide are ethnic conflicts. Even more striking, 170 million people were killed in ethnicity-driven conflicts between 1900 and 1987 worldwide. Yet, although ethnic conflict would appear to be a worldwide phenomenon, it is neither the norm nor a certain fate in some multiethnic nations.

A better way of understanding ethnic conflict prevention is to explore the causes of conflict. Rather than relegating the causes of conflict to “ancient hatreds,” examining these causes in the first place helped me to understand the complexity of the phenomenon and to develop the four-fold framework for mitigating the conflict. Of the many different theories about the possible causes of ethnic conflict, ranging from financial motives to cultural values that glorify feuding, I found that Byman’s theories proved most satisfying.

Ethnic security dilemma, status concerns, hegemonic ambitions, and leadership behavior have played significant roles in the outbreak of ethnic conflict in many countries, ranging from the former Yugoslavia to Malaysia.

However, understanding the explaining causes of ethnic conflict was not the end but the beginning of my study. After defining these causes, I developed a solution in a coherent four-fold framework. The framework addresses the selected causes of conflict, which are discussed in this study and provide a package of solutions to be applied by political decision makers.

Population control is one of the tools I discussed in the framework. I argued in this study that there should be some set of principles to control the dynamics of a multiethnic society. However, according to the consensus versus coercion model, the degree of population control will vary according to the amount of consensus a country has. For example, I concluded that, whereas in Switzerland, minimal police action will

provide the required security for society, in countries such as India and Sri Lanka, where ethnic relations among different groups are problematic, much deeper control will be needed.

Population control provides security for all parts of society and prevents the security dilemma from mobilizing the masses. However, no function of government is more sensitive than physical law enforcement. Nothing can turn good citizens against government more quickly than militarized police forces that treat populations along ethnic lines. Hence, the last point of population control policies is that the formation of security forces is as important as the enforcement of policies.

Later in this study I proposed a model to win the “hearts and minds” of the population because I deeply believe that ethnic peace cannot be maintained solely by population control policies. Governmental policies should address the psychological and structural disequilibrium between the expectations of ethnic groups and governmental policies. I argued that in multiethnic societies, these efforts should rest on two pillars: psychological initiatives and structural initiatives. Governmental policies need to address psychological expectations, such as recognition, equal justice, and leadership behavior, as well as eliminate or diminish structural inequalities, such as economic, educational, and cultural imbalances. Some of the policies discussed in these initiatives have already been used as reconciliation processes by governments in Malaysia, Northern Ireland, and Belgium, where they have contributed to moderating ethnic peace.

In this work, I likewise discussed identity hardening as a governmental policy. The reality of our time is that multiethnic states are becoming the norm. However, the belief in the importance of the nation-state still persists. Hence, governments around the world are directly or indirectly engaging in some form of identity-hardening campaigns. Whereas Turkey and Malaysia used education extensively to build a common national identity, France used its language to build a national identity. In this study, I discussed the idea that strengthening national identity through religion is another notable way to achieve cohesion for multiethnic nations. Religion is still an important part of defining national identity in both Israel and Saudi Arabia. Beyond those methods, the promulgation of national symbols, such as a national flag, a national anthem, and national

heroes, are widely used by different countries. Although identity-building tools like education, religion, language, and the promulgation of national symbols can be divisive in multiethnic societies, through the careful implementation of well-crafted governmental policies, they could instead be indispensable tools for building a cohesive national identity.

The last tool of the four-fold framework is reengineering the political system. I argue that the arrangement of the political space with regard to representation in the electoral system greatly affects the potential of ethnic conflict. In this sense, while there is a considerable consensus regarding the importance of the electoral system in shaping the wider political arena, there is disagreement among political scientists as to which electoral systems are most appropriate for multiethnic nations. I proposed that consociational democracy is the ideal power-sharing arrangement in such a situation. My reasons are two fold. First, the mechanisms and institutions embedded in consociational democracy provide proportional representation and ensure that minority voices are heard in the decision making process. Second, the most important advantage of consociational democracy over other power-sharing alternatives is that it has been successfully implemented in many countries, including Belgium, the Netherlands, Malaysia (1955–1969), and Lebanon (1943–1975).

Finally, I applied my four-fold framework to present day Iraq. There are some grave findings as well as some promising ones. Unquestionably, the biggest challenge in Iraq is the security dilemma. The security situation is a complicated problem. Militias, peshmerga, death squads, the political will of governmental officials and outsiders are some of the factors. Taken altogether, it is clear that the way to a governable Iraq is, first and foremost, through securing its people. I recommended that the Iraqi government disband all unofficial militias and build its national security forces immediately.

On the other hand, the December 15, 2005, election and the formation of the national unity government were two other important steps toward building a governable and sustainable democracy in Iraq. I emphasized that consociational democracy had

already been rooted in Iraq. Both the national parliamentary elections and the formation of the national unity government of Iraq incorporated the four mechanisms of consociational democracy.

In the future, this framework could be applied to other ethnic conflicts in order to test it further. This will help us to understand how the four-fold framework performs in different conflicts and with different cultures. However, we had better keep in mind that those policies should be implemented with a strong determination to see results.

Another future study in this area would be examining the ability of non-governmental agencies to prevent ethnic conflict. What do they offer to governments? Could they become power brokers in places where grievances are hard to bridge? I asked these questions, because in today's world, civic leaders have become significant players in both domestic and international politics.

In sum, the four-fold framework is aimed at preventing ethnic conflict in multiethnic societies. It provides a coherent and consistent recipe for policymakers. However, any kind of government policies dealing with ethnic conflict have to be strongly supported and implemented by all sector of government. Ethnic leaders must set aside their differences and see the dangers of non-cooperation. Keeping financial costs and human losses in mind, every effort to prevent ethnic conflict is worth exploring.

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